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CHALLENGING CONGLOMERATE MERGERS UNDER
SECTION 7 OF THE CLAYTON ACT:




Federal antitrust enforcement has undergone a radical transformation
in the past decade. From 1953 to 1969-the span of the Warren Court-
the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission built a
formidable record in the antitrust field, winning virtually every case taken
to the Supreme Court.' This trend continued at a reduced pace into the
first years of the Burger Court but then reversed significantly; 2 since the
1973 Term, the government has lost more antitrust cases than it has won.
3
The change in enforcement patterns has been most noticeable in the area
of merger law. 4 The United States was successful in all merger cases not
involving regulated industries decided by full opinion of the Supreme
Court between 1950 and the Court's 1972 Term.' Since 1974, however,
* Associate Professor of Law, Notre Dame Law School. A.B., University of Pennsylvania,
1966; J.D., Harvard Law School, 1969. Portions of an earlier version of this article appeared in
a memorandum prepared by the author for the Federal Trade Commission in August 1977.
The views expressed here, however, are solely those of the author and do not represent the
views of the Commission or its staff. The author would like to express his thanks to Edward
DeVivo and John Ruhl, members of the Notre Dame Law School Class of 1978, for their
assistance in the preparation of this article.
' In the sixteen terms of the Warren Court, defendants were successful in only three of 48
cases initiated by the Department of Justice and ultimately decided by full opinion of the
Supreme Court. In addition, of the 21 cases initiated by the Federal Trade Commission and
decided by full opinion, only two were won by defendants. See Kauper, The "Warren Court"
and the Antitrust Laws: Of Economics, Populism, and Cynicism, 67 Mich. L. Rev. 325, 337 &
n.48 (1968); McGee, The Burger Court Looks at the Antitrust Laws: A New Approach?, 2
Barrister 21, 27 (Winter 1975) (updating statistics from Kauper article).
2 From 1969 to 1972, the Department ofJustice prevailed in nine of eleven cases in which a
full opinion was written. The Federal Trade Commission was successful in the only case that it
brought during this period. See McGee, supra note 1, at 27.
' An examination of the United States Reports indicates that the Department of Justice
prevailed in three of eight cases decided by full opinion in the 1973 through 1977 Terms. The
Federal Trade Commission was not involved in any such cases in the Supreme Court during
this period.
Private plaintiffs have been similarly unsuccessful; during the 1976 Term, for example, the
Court rejected the antitrust claims of such plaintiffs in all five cases decided by full opinion. See
Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350 (1977) (plaintiff prevailed on other grounds);
Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977); Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois,
431 U.S. 720 (1977); U.S. Steel Corp. v. Fortner Enterprises, Inc., 429 U.S. 610 (1977);
Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477 (1977). See also Vendo Co. v.
Lektro-Vend Corp., 434 U.S. 881 (1977) (federal injunction against enforcement of state
antitrust judgment denied under the Federal Anti-Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1970)).
4 In accordance with the language of section 7 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1970),
"merger" as used in this article includes both partial and total acquisition of the stock or assets
of one corporation by another, either for cash or securities.
' Sloviter, The October 1973 Term Merger Cases: Whither Clayton § 7?, 48 Temp. L.Q.
861, 861;see id. at 912-16 (table of relevant decisions). The approach of the Warren Court to
merger law is reflected in Justice Stewart's comment in a 1966 decision: "The sole consistency
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four of the five antitrust enforcement cases lost by the government in the
Supreme Court have involved mergers. 6 Similarly, there has been a
noticeable trend favoring defendants in conglomerate merger cases 7 in
the federal courts at all levels. Overall, there have been eleven successful
challenges to conglomerate mergers since 1964; significantly, none of
these occurred after 1974.8 Moreover, twelve of twenty-two unsuccessful
conglomerate merger attacks took place between 1974 and 1977. 9
that I can find is that in litigation under § 7, the Government always wins." United States v.
Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270, 301 (1966) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
6 The unsuccessful merger challenges were United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 415
U.S. 486 (1974); United States v. Marine Bancorporation, Inc., 418 U.S. 602 (1974); United
States v. Citizens & Southern Nat'l Bank, 422 U.S. 86 (1975); and United States v. American
Bldg. Maintenance Indus., 422 U.S. 271 (1975). The other unsuccessful government action,
United States v. National Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, 422 U.S. 694 (1975), involved price fixing.
The shift in the Court's attitude first became evident in United States v. ICC, 396 U.S. 491
(1970), in which the merger of several railroads was upheld after regulatory approval despite
Justice Department protest. The full extent of the change was clear by 1974; Justice Stewart
authored the majority opinion in United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486
(1974), and Justice Douglas, usually in the majority in antitrust cases of the 1950s and 1960s,
was in the dissent, see id. at 527 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
I The term "conglomerate merger" was originally used to identify mergers between two
companies in completely unrelated fields of business. It is more commonly considered,
however, to include all mergers other than those that are principally horizontal or vertical. A
horizontal merger is one involving companies cdmpeting in the same product and geographic
markets; a vertical merger involves the combination of companies in an actual or potential
buyer-seller relationship.
The term "conglomerate merger" encompasses geographic extension, product extension
and "pure" conglomerate mergers. A geographic extension merger is one in which the
acquiring and acquired firms share the same product market but operate in different areas. A
product extension merger involves companies in the same geographic market but different, if
still related, product lines. Mergers falling into neither of these two categories are classified as
"pure" conglomerate mergers. See generally P. Areeda, Antitrust Analysis 657 (1974).
Conglomerate Merger Cases--Successful Challenges
United States v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 376 U.S. 651 (1964) (geographic extension)
United States v. Penn-Olin Chemical Co., 378 U.S. 158 (1964) (joint venture) (geographic
extension as to Pennsalt, product extension as to Olin-Mathieson)
Ekco Products Co. v. FTC, 347 F.2d 745 (7th Cir. 1965) (product extension)
United States v. Joseph Schlitz Brewing Co., 253 F. Supp. 129 (N.D. Cal.) (geographic
extension), aff'd per curiam, 385 U.S. 37 (1966)
FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568 (1967) (product extension)
General Foods Corp. v. FTC, 386 F.2d 936 (3d Cir. 1967) (product extension), cert. denied, 391
U.S. 919 (1968)
United States v. Wilson Sporting Goods Co., 288 F. Supp. 543 (N.D. Ill. 1968) (product
extension)
Allis-Chalmers Manufacturing Co. v. White Consolidated Industries, Inc., 414 F.2d 506 (3d
Cir. 1969) (product extension), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1009 (1970)
FTC v. Bendix Corp., 77 F.T.C. 731 (1970) (product extension), rev'd on other grounds, 450
F.2d 534 (6th Cir. 1971)
Kennecott Copper Corp. v. FTC, 467 F.2d 67 ( 10th Cir. 1972) (product extension), cert. denied,
416 U.S. 909 (1974)
United States v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 367 F. Supp. 1226 (C.D. Cal. 1973) (geographic
extension), aff'd mem., 418 U.S. 906 (1974)
9 Conglomerate Merger Cases--Unsuccessful Challenges
United States v. Penn-Olin Chemical Co., 246 F. Supp. 917 (D. Del. 1965), aff'd by equally
divided Court, 389 U.S. 308 (1967) (joint venture)
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The magnitude of this shift, the confusion that has characterized the
case law accompanying it, and the increasing prominence of conglomerate
mergers as a means to corporate expansion10 form the basis for this
United States v. Crocker-Anglo National Bank, 277 F. Supp. 133 (N.D. Cal. 1967) (geographic
extension)
United States v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 297 F. Supp. 1061 (S.D.N.Y. 1969) (geographic
extension), aff'd sub nom., Bartlett v. United States, 401 U.S. 986 (1971)
United States v. Northwest Industries, Inc., 301 F. Supp. 1066 (N.D. Il. 1969) (denial of
preliminary injunction) (mixed conglomerate)
United States v. International Telephone & Telegraph Corp., 324 F. Supp. 19 (D. Conn.
1970) (judgment for defendant) (product extension, Grinnell Corp.), consent judgment en-
tered, [19711 Trade Cas. 73,665 (D. Conn. 1971)
United States v. International Telephone & Telegraph Corp., 306 F. Supp. 766 (D. Conn.
1969) (denial of preliminary injunction) (product extension, Hartford Fire Ins. Co.), consent
judgment entered, [1971] Trade Cas. 73,666 (D. Conn. 1971)
United States v. Ling-Temco-Vought, Inc., 315 F. Supp. 1301 (W.D. Pa. 1970) (conditional
consent judgment) (product extension), final consent judgment entered, [1970] Trade Cas.
73,105 (W.D. Pa. 1970)
United States v. International Telephone & Telegraph Corp., [1971] Trade Cas. 73,619
.(N.D. Ill. 1971) (denial of preliminary injunction) (product extension) (Canteen Corp.),
consent judgment entered, [1971] Trade Cas. 73,667 (N.D. 111. 1971)
In re Sterling Drug Co., 80 F.T.C. 477, 579 (1972) (product extension)
United States v. Crowell, Collier & Macmillan, Inc., 361 F. Supp. 983 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (product
extension)
In re General Mills, Inc., 83 F.T.C. 696, 729 (1973) (product extension)
Missouri Portland Cement Co. v. Cargill, Inc., 498 F.2d 851 (2d Cir.) (product extension), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 883 (1974)
United States v. Marine Bancorporation, Inc., 418 U.S. 602 (1974) (geographic extension)
United States v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 383 F. Supp. 1020 (D.R.I. 1974) (geographic
extension), judgment for defendant on remand from 410 U.S.
In re Beatrice Foods Co., 86 F.T.C. 1, 54 (1975) (divestiture order as to one of two acquisitions)
(product extension), aff'd sub nom. Beatrice Foods Co. v. FTC, 540 F.2d 303 (7th Cir. 1970)
In re Budd Co., 86 F.T.C. 518, 569 (1975) (product extension)
United States v. Hughes Tool Co., 415 F. Supp. 637 (C.D. Cal. 1976) (product extension)
United States v. Black & Decker Manufacturing Co., 430 F. Supp. 729 (D. Md. 1976) (product
extension)
FTC v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 549 F.2d 289 (4th Cir. 1977) (denial of preliminary injunction)
(product extension)
BOC International Ltd. v. FTC, 557 F.2d 24 (2d Cir. 1977) (geographic extension)
FTC v. Tenneco, Inc., 433 F. Supp. 105 (D.D.C. 1977) (denial of preliminary injunction)
(product extension), request for stay denied, [1977-A] Trade Cas. 61,470 (D.C. Cir. .1977)
Babcock & Wilcox Co. v. United Technologies Corp., 435 F. Supp. 1249 (N.D. Ohio 1977)
(product extension)
Horizontal and Vertical Merger Cases-Successful Challenges
with Significant Potential Competition Analysis
Reynolds Metals Co. v. FTC, 309 F.2d 223 (D.C. Cir. 1962) (vertical merger)
'United States v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 320 F.2d 509 (3d Cir. 1963) (horizontal and ,product
.extension mergers)
United States v. Continental Can Co., 378 U.S. 441 (1964) (horizontal merger)
United States v. Standard Oil Co. (New Jersey), 253 F. Supp. 196 (D.N.J. 1966) (vertical
merger)
United States Steel Corp. v. FTC, 426 F.2d 592 (6th Cir. 1970) (vertical merger)
Ford Motor Co. v. United States, 405 U.S. 562 (1972) (vertical merger)
Stanley Works v. FTC, 469 F.2d 498 (2d Cir. 1972) (horizontal merger), cert. denied, 412 U.S.
928 (1973)
United States v. Amax, Inc., 402 F. Supp. 956 (D. Conn. 1975) (horizontal merger)
10 The number of large horizontal and vertical mergers that are taking place has declined,
perhaps because judicial standards for these kinds of acquisitions are better defined, and
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article. The primary source for regulation of mergers under the antitrust
laws is section 7 of the Clayton Act," which proscribes those corporate
acquisitions "where in any line of commerce in any section of the country,
the effect of such acquisition may be substantially to lessen competition, or
tend to create a monopoly."' 2 Although section 7 clearly applies to all
types of mergers,' 3 the construction given it by the Supreme Court in
recent years has rendered it particularly ineffective for control of con-
glomerate mergers. In attempting to adapt section 7 to the regulation of
such mergers, the government has relied upon two theoretical ap-
proaches. The approach most frequently relied upon in practice, and the
principal subject of recent Supreme Court attention, focuses upon the
potential competitive consequences of loss of the acquiring company
either as an actual future entrant into the acquired company's market or
as an entity perceived by competitors as a potential entrant into that
market. A second, less popular, theory looks to the direct anticompetitive
effects of entry by the acquiring firm into the acquired company's market.
This article will detail the two government approaches and analyze the
limitations placed upon their application by recent decisions of the Su-
preme Court. At the same time, the article will also consider a third
approach-rejected by the courts as outside the scope of the Clayton Act
but nonetheless essential to any analysis of present and future antitrust
enforcement-which emphasizes noneconomic factors, looking beyond
competitive impact to the social and political implications of the concen-
tration of corporate assets in the hands of a few dozen or hundred firms.
Analysis of these three approaches will highlight the extent of the Su-
preme Court's shift in attitude toward merger enforcement, 1 4 a shift that
companies are increasingly turning to mergers with less related companies. The FTC reported
that, in 1975, of the 59 acquisitions of manufacturing and mining companies with $10 million
or more in assets, only four were horizontal mergers and only three were vertical; the other 52
were conglomerate. Of 77 such acquisitions in 1976, 12 were horizontal, 4 vertical and 61
conglomerate. The significance of these statistics becomes even more evident if the assets of
the acquired firms are also considered. In 1975, conglomerate mergers accounted for 94.6%
of the assets of all firms acquired through merger and in 1976 for 87.2% of the assets of such
firms. By comparison, for the period 1948 through 1975, conglomerate mergers accounted
for 74.9% of the assets of all acquired firms involved in large scale mergers. FTC Statistical
Report on Mergers and Acquisitions, tables 18, 19 (Nov. 1977) (based upon preliminary 1976
statistics). There appears to be a continuing trend toward large scale mergers, spurred both by
the apparent advantages of such acquisitions as a means of corporate expansion and by the
desires of foreign investors for the security of United States assets. See Winter, Conservative
Firms Bent on Profit Growth Join the Merger Chase, Wall St. J., Apr. 11, 1978, at 1, col. 6.
11 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27, 44 (1970), as amended, (Supp. V 1975), as amended, Act of Sept. 30,
1976, Pub. L. No. 94-435, § 201, 90 Stat. 1383.
12 Id. § 18 (1970), as amended, Act of Sept. 30, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-435, § 201, 90 Stat. 1383.
'" See, e.g., United States v. Marine Bancorporation, Inc., 418 U.S. 602, 618 (1974); United
States v. Continental Can Co., 378 U.S. 441, 447, 458 (1964).
14 This shift may reflect changes in the Court's personnel. During the period 1969-1971,
four Supreme Court Justices (Chief Justice Burger, Justice Blackmun, Justice Powell and
Justice Rehnquist) were appointed by President Nixon. President Nixon had stated earlier that
he intended to appoint "strict constructionists" to the Supreme Court. See, e.g., N.Y. Times,
Oct. 4, 1968, at 50, col. 2.
Alternatively, the Court's attitude toward merger enforcement might be attributed to the
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marks an enormous change in direction for regulation of corporate eco-
nomic activity and calls for reevaluation of the Clayton Act itself. The
article will conclude with consideration of the necessary elements-
political and social as well as economic--of such a reevaluation and with
specific suggestions for legislative reform.
II. POTENTIAL COMPETITION DOCTRINE
Under the Clayton Act, the legality of a corporate acquisition is deter-
mined primarily with reference to competitive effect. Yet there are sig-
nificant qualitative differences between the evaluation of this effect in
conglomerate merger cases and in other situations. In horizontal and
vertical mergers, the focus for determination of competitive effect is
logically upon actual competition within the target market. When the
merging companies are competitors, a court can look to the lessening of
competition that results from removal of one of two formerly effective
market participants; when the companies are in a buyer-seller relationship
prior to merger, the court can attempt to predict the anticompetitive
effects of loss of sales between the merging companies and their former
customers and suppliers. In the case of a conglomerate merger, however,
the merging companies are, by definition, neither present competitors nor
parties to an actual or potential buyer-seller relationship. Because con-
glomerate merger cases thus present problems in attempting to demon-
strate successfully the increase in concentration in a particular market, or
the direct foreclosure of competitive opportunity that forms the basis for
challenges to other types of corporate acquisitions, the potential competi-
tion theory has developed. 5 Under this theory, a court looks to the
competitive market situation that might have developed at some future
impersonal influence of time upon the force and direction of legislative enactments. See notes
178-80 and accompanying text infra.
"5 See generally FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568, 586-90 (1967) (Harlan, J.,
concurring); Blair, The Conglomerate Merger in Economics and Law, 46 Geo. L.J. 672,
673-74 (1958).
The two earliest cases dealing with potential competition were United States v. El Paso
Natural Gas Co., 376 U.S. 651 (1964), and United States v. Continental Can Co., 378 U.S. 441
(1964). In the El Paso case, a large regional supplier of natural gas acquired a company that
had sought, unsuccessfully, to expand into the defendant's territory. The Court, in making its
finding of a section 7 violation, analyzed the transaction as a geographic market extension
merger; some later commentators have suggested that this case should have been treated as a
horizontal merger, since the acquisition under scrutiny involved foreclosure of actual, if only
incipient, competition between the two companies. See United States v. Marine Bancorpora-
tion, Inc., 418 U.S. 602, 623 & n.24 (1974).
Continental Can involved an acquisition by the nation's second largest metal can manufac-
turer of the third largest glass container manufacturer. Rather than analyzing this as a
product extension merger, the Court held that it was an unlawful horizontal merger between
the second and sixth largest companies in the "can-glass market." See United States v. Conti-
nental Can Co., 378 U.S. 441, 444 n.2 (1964) (discussion of relevant concept of "industry").
Two other conglomerate merger cases that contributed significantly to developing the
principles still under consideration today are United States v. Penn-Olin Chem. Co., 378 U.S.
158 (1964) (joint ventures), and FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568 (1967) (product
extension mergers).
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date in the absence of merger. In practice, this doctrine involves two
related approaches to the evaluation of proposed acquisitions: the actual
potential entrant theory and the perceived potential entrant theory.
A. Actual Potential Entrant Theory
Courts invoking the actual potential entrant theory are concerned with the
loss of probable future entry into the acquired company's market by the
acquiring company by means other than the merger in question. Such
alternative entry can occur either through internal expansion-de novo
entry-or through acquisition of a smaller, less significant competitor
already within the market-toehold entry.1 6 The theory assumes that
alternative entry into an oligopolistic, and thus less than fully competitive,
target market would have introduced an additional factor into the market,
with resulting direct and indirect economic benefits: competition would be
improved, production capacity increased, prices lowered and the range of
available goods and services expanded. Moreover, an increase in the
number of competitors within the target market would presumably help
to inhibit the development and maintenance of collusive pricing schemes.
The dominant case interpreting the actual potential entrant doctrine as
a basis for proscription of conglomerate mergers is United States v. Marine
Bancorporation, Inc.,17 in which the United States challenged a proposed
merger between two large banks in the State of Washington."8 The gov-
ernment in Marine Bancorporation relied principally upon the assertion
that the acquiring bank could have entered the acquired bank's market
through the more procompetitive means of toehold acquisition or internal
expansion; 19 the defendants challenged both the viability of the actual
potential entrant doctrine in general and the government's specific asser-
tion that alternative means of entry were available to the acquiring bank.
Although recognizing that it had not previously faced this particular form
of potential competition theory, 20 the Supreme Court announced three
A possibility yet to be considered as an alternative form of entry would be entry by joint
venture. In an industry in which entry requires high capital formation or sophisticated
technology, a joint venture might be more reasonable and likely than single firm de novo
entry. Joint ventures also hold out the benefit of a new market force with potential for
deconcentration. But cf. United States v. Penn-Olin Chem. Co., 378 U.S. 158, 173 (1964)
(section 7 reaches joint ventures; consideration must be given to elimination of potential
competition at the market fringe and to foreclosure of possible competition between the joint
venturers).
17 418 U.S..602 (1974).
"8 The proposed merger involved an attempt by the second largest bank in Seattle to
acquire the third largest bank in Spokane. Such a transaction, in which the acquiring and
acquired companies are in the same product market, is commonly referred to as a geographic
extension merger. See note 7 supra.
I" The government also presented a secondary claim based upon perceived potential
entrant doctrine. See notes 97-120 and accompanying text infra.
20 418 U.S. at 625 & n.28. The Court had expressly reserved consideration of the actual
potential entrant doctrine in an earlier geographic extension merger case, see United States v.
Falstaff Brewing Corp., 410 U.S. 526, 537 (1973). See also United States v. Penn-Olin Chem.
Co., 378 U.S. 158, 172-74 (1964) (discussion of application of actual potential entrant doctrine
to joint venture challenged under section 7).
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conditions essential to application of the actual potential entrant doctrine:
(1) the target market must be concentrated; 21 (2) an alternative method
for entry must exist and be available to the acquiring firm; 22 and (3) the
alternative method of entry must offer a reasonable prospect for long-
term structural improvement or other competitive benefit to the target
market.2 3 Because the second and third of these conditions were not met
in Marine Bancorporation, the Court declined to apply the doctrine and,
accordingly, approved the merger.
1. Concentrated or Oligopolistic Market
The application of the actual potential entrant doctrine presupposes
that the acquired company's market prior to merger is less than fully
competitive. In a truly competitive market, the entry of an actual potential
entrant, whether through the challenged merger or other means, could
have no significant effect upon competition. Normally a correlation exists
between intensity of competition and level of concentration in a particular
market, and concentration levels have historically served as indicators of
market competition for purposes of the Clayton Act.24 Thus, in actual
potential entrant cases, a preliminary burden is placed upon the govern-
ment to prove that the target market is concentrated.25 Concentration is
determined with reference to the number of firms operating within the
target market and the total market shares of the dominant firms within
that market.
26
There are, of course, limits to exclusive reliance upon concentration as
the measure of a market's competitive level. Little agreement exists with
respect to the degree of concentration that will permit the inference of
21 See 418 U.S. at 630.
22 See id. at 633, 638.
23 See id. at 638-39.
24 See United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486, 496-98 (1973) (horizontal
merger); Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 318 & n.38, 343-45 & n.72 (1962).
Note that, strictly speaking, the type of market concentration relevant to potential competition
doctrine is comparable to the concentration used to evaluate the competitive impact of
horizontal mergers, as contrasted with the test of market foreclosure relevant to evaluation of
vertical mergers. See id. at 323-24.
25 United States v. Marine Bancorporation, Inc., 418 U.S. at 630.
The potential-competition doctrine has meaning only as applied to concentrated mar-
kets. 'That is, the doctrine comes into play only where there are dominant participants in
the target market engaging in interdependent or parallel behavior and with the capacity
effectively to determine price and total output of goods or services. If the target market
performs as a competitive market in traditional antitrust terms, the participants in the
market will have no occasion to fashion their behavior to take into account e presence
of a potential entrant. The present procompetitive effects that a perceived potential
entrant may produce in an oligopolistic market will already have been accomplished if
the target market is performing competitively. Likewise, there would be no need for
concern about the prospects of long-term deconcentration of a market which is in fact
genuinely competitive.
Id. at 630-31. As this passage makes clear, the concentration requirement is equally applicable
to both perceived and actual potential entrant doctrines. See text accompanying note 101-02
infra.
"i See, e.g., United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486, 494-96 (1974); United
States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270, 273 & n.3 (1966).
19781 205
BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 58:199
oligopolistic conduct necessary to justify application of the potential en-
trant doctrine.27 Furthermore, proof of concentration may, in some situa-
tions, be made through evidence that a particular market, not yet sig-
nificantly concentrated, is tending toward concentration. 28 Such consid-
erations suggest that courts should consider other factors relevant to
competition, such as artificial and natural barriers to entry into a particu-
lar geographic or product market. For example, a lower level of concen-
tration might be sufficient to indicate an oligopoly when there are special
restraints upon entry into a market by new competitors. Similarly, evi-
dence of market performance might, in some situations, serve to override
structural indicators of concentration.
According to the Court in Marine Bancorporation, proof of market con-
centration establishes only a prima facie case for a noncompetitive market
and thus for application of potential competition theory; after such proof
is presented, the burden shifts to the defendant to present evidence that
concentration ratios do not accurately reflect the competitive state of the
target market. 29 In discussing the prima facie nature of the government's
proof of concentration, the Court referred to an earlier horizontal merger
case, United States v. General Dynamics Corp.,3 0 in which a defendant suc-
cessfully rebutted the government's showing that the coal industry was
concentrated. In General Dynamics, the government had relied upon levels
of past production to determine concentration, but the defendant was
27 Most courts and writers seem to agree that an industry is concentrated if the market
share of the four largest firms is between 50% and 70%. Professor Bain concluded that a
four-firm concentration ratio of 50% to 65% constitutes "high-moderate" concentration, J.
Bain, Industrial Organization 128 (1959). Professors Kaysen and Turner view an industry as a
tight oligopoly when the eight (or fewer) largest firms supply 50% of the market, if the largest
firm supplies 20% or more. C. Kaysen & D. Turner, Antitrust Policy: An Economic and Legal
Analysis 72 (1959). The Department of Justice's Merger Guidelines view an industry as
"highly concentrated" if the four largest firms account for 75% of the industry's market share.
United States Dep't of Justice, Merger Guideline No. 5 (1965), reprinted in 1 Trade Reg. Rep.
(CCH) 4510 (1975). But cf. Kirkpatrick & Mahinka, The Supreme Court and the "New
Economic Realism" of Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 30 Sw. L.J. 821, 832-35 (1976) (criticizing
the almost exclusive reliance given to concentration levels as indicators of vigorous competi-
tion and suggesting tests other than four-firm market percentage as basis for determination of
concentration).
For a listing of the industry concentration ratios in the principal conglomerate merger cases,
see United States v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 430 F. Supp. 729, 749-50 & n.40 (D. Md. 1976),
and Dunfee & Stern, Potential Competition Theory as an Anti-Merger Tool Under Section 7
of the Clayton Act: A Decision Model, 69 Nw. U.L. Rev. 821, 826-27 (1975).
21 In Kennecott Copper Corp. v. FTC, 467 F.2d 67 (10th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 416 U.S.
909 (1974), the Federal Trade Commission challenged the acquisition by Kennecott, the
nation's largest copper producer, of Peabody Coal, one of the two leading American coal
producers. The Commission was successful in persuading the court to permit application of
the potential competition doctrine. This was done on the basis of evidence that the market
shares of the largest coal producers had been increasing since World War II, despite contrary
.evidence that the current share of Peabody Coal was only 10% and of the four largest
producers only 29%. See id. at 76. See also FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568, 595
(1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
29 418 U.S. at 631. The Court specifically noted that neither party in Marine Bancorporation
"undertook any significant study of the performance, as compared to the structure, of the
commercial banking market in Spokane." Id.
30 415 U.S. 486 (1974).
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able to show that, because of depletion of coal reserves, predictions of
present and future production more accurately reflected the actual state
of the industry. 31 It should be noted, however, that concentration serves
very different purposes in horizontal and conglomerate merger cases. In
a horizontal merger case, such as General Dynamics, proof that the com-
bined market share of the merging companies will exceed a certain level
after merger creates a rebuttable presumption that the merger will tend
to lessen competition in violation of section 7.32 By contrast, in a conglom-
erate merger case, proof that the market shares of those companies
already opei-ating within the target- market exceed a certain level indicates
only that the target market is less than competitive prior to merger and
thus establishes one of several necessary preconditions to application of
the potential competition doctrine. Consequently, despite the Court's
passing reference to the General Dynamics case in Marine Bancorporation, it
is not clear how the defense established in that case could be transferred
to a case involving a conglomerate merger.
33
2. Alternative Entry Both Feasible and Likely
The second precondition imposed in Marine Bancorporation34-proof of
the availability of feasible and likely means of alternative entry3 -has
posed a more substantial obstacle to successful application of the actual
potential entrant doctrine by the government.3 6 Four factors predominate
in evaluation of this requirement by the courts: (a) the extent of the
acquiring firm's incentives for entry; (b) the firm's ability to enter the
market, either de novo or through acquisition of a toehold competitor; (c)
the temporal immediacy of entry; and (d) the evidence demonstrating the
probability of alternative entry.
(a) Incentives for Entry. Any determination whether, in the absence of
merger, a particular company would have acquired a smaller competitor
or entered a market de novo involves a considerable degree of specula-
tion. The proposed merger itself gives contradictory evidence: it indicates
some interest in the product and geographic market of the acquired firm,
but, at the same time, suggests that the acquiring company has considered
3' See id. at 501-04.
32 See United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 362-65 (1963).
11 For example, it could be argued that the phenomenon of "limit pricing" underlying the
perceived potential entrant doctrine, see text accompanying notes 97-99 infra, depends directly
upon a certain level of market concentration in a way that proof of the anticompetitive effect
of a horizontal merger does not.
34 See 418 U.S. at 633.
31 Unless otherwise specified, references to "alternative entry" in the following discussion
include both toehold and de novo entry.
31 See BOC Int'l Ltd. v. FTC, 557 F.2d 24, 28-30 (2d Cir. 1977) (failure to prove substantial
likelihood of entry by alternative means); accord, FTC v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 549 F.2d 289,
294-98 (4th Cir. 1977) (denial of preliminary injunction); FTC v. Tenneco, Inc., 433 F. Supp.
105, 114 (D.D.C.) (denial of preliminary injunction), request for stay pending appeal denied per
curiam, 1977-1 Trade Cas. 61,470 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
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and rejected competitively preferable alternatives. 7 Both the nature of
the target market and the characteristics of the acquiring company are
relevant to determination of the company's actual motivation. With re-
spect to the target market, potential for high profits, 38 the need for
immediate entry-either to foreclose future expansion of the acquired
company into the acquiring company's own market39 or to avoid difficul-
ties with its own expansion at a later date4 0 -and the prestige value of
expansion into the acquired company's market 41 are all possible criteria.
Investigation into the acquiring company's characteristics might include
consideration of evidence of surplus capital available for investment 42 and
the acquiring company's possible need, because of its product line, for
expansion into new geographic areas in order to profit from national
advertising strategies. 43 Also relevant, if expansion is into a related prod-
uct area, is whether the proposed merger would enable the acquiring
company to offer its existing customers a more complete product line or
to reach a broader class of customers. 44 More general considerations
might include unused production capacity, economies of scale, compatible
technology, and overlapping production or marketing procedures in
either the acquiring company itself or in the target market.
45
(b) Ability to Enter by Alternative Means. Application of the actual potential
entrant theory presupposes that the acquiring company has the capacity,
as well as the incentive, to attempt alternative entry. This capacity will
vary with the nature of the two companies and their respective markets,
with the nature of the proposed merger-geographic or product
extension-and with the type of alternative entry available-de novo or
toehold.
In the case of de novo alternative entry, a defendant's primary objective
is to demonstrate the potential obstacles to successful development of a
new market competitor. Sophisticated technological requirements or the
need for specific patents may substantially limit or effectively foreclose
" But see United States v. Crocker-Anglo Nat'l Bank, 277 F. Supp. 133, 184 (N.D. Cal.
1967) (proof of entry or desire to enter by merger not itself evidence of ability or desire to
enter de novo). See generally Berger & Peterson, Conglomerate Mergers and Criteria for
Defining Potential Entrants, 15 Antitrust Bull. 489, 495-96 (1970).
" See, e.g., United States v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 430 F. Supp. 729, 743 (D. Md. 1976);
United States v. Wilson Sporting Goods Co., 288 F. Supp. 543, 561 (N.D. Ill. 1968).
31 See, e.g., United States v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 376 U.S. 651, 654 (1964); United States
v. Joseph Schlitz Brewing Co., 253 F. Supp. 129, 147 (N.D. Cal.), aff'd per curiam, 385 U.S. 37
(1966).
41 See, e.g., United States v. Penn-Olin Chem. Co., 378 U.S. 158, 166-67 (1964).
41 See, e.g., United States v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 367 F. Supp. 1226, 1245-46 (C.D. Cal.
1973), aff'd per curiam, 418 U.S. 906 (1974).
42 See, e.g., FTC v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 549 F.2d 289, 295 (4th Cir. 1977); Kennecott
Copper Corp. v. FTC, 467 F.2d 67, 71 (10th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 909 (1974).
43 See, e.g., United States v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 410 U.S. 526, 529 (1973).
41 See, e.g., Ekco Prods. Co. v. FTC, 347 F.2d 745, 753 (7th Cir. 1965); United States v.
Wilson Sporting Goods Co., 288 F. Supp. 543, 547, 561 (N.D. Il. 1968).
" See, e.g., United States v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 410 U.S. 526, 529 (1973); FTC v.
Tenneco, Inc., 433 F. Supp. 105, 111-12 (D.D.C. 1977); United States v. Black & Decker Mfg.
Co., 430 F. Supp. 729, 758-63 (D. Md. 1976).
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entry into particular fields.46 In some situations, similar results may be
achieved by direct legal barriers imposed by regulatory or licensing au-
thorities.47 The existing operation of significant economies of scale in
production or distribution may require that a new firm take substantial
business from existing competitors, with commensurate effect upon initial
capitalization costs and the projected rate of return for the acquiring
company.48 An historical pattern of large promotional and advertising
expenditures49 or of high consumer loyalty"° may greatly increase the
difficulties of establishing significant market penetration, as may particu-
lar marketing and distribution requirements, such as the need for an
extensive and established system of distributor-customers."
The government must show that such alternative entry is in fact feasible
despite possible market obstacles. The financial strength of the acquiring
company is obviously the single most significant countervailing considera-
tion.52 Also relevant, however, are the company's technological expertise,
its existing distributional network and advertising program, and the com-
patibility of its product line or geographical position with that of the
acquired firm and its market. The relative importance of these factors will
vary with the characteristics of the target market and acquiring, company
and with the method of proposed entry. Technological expertise may not
46 Compare FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568, 580 (1967) (no special patents or
technical data required for entry into bleach market), with United States v. Black & Decker
Mfg. Co., 430 F. Supp. 729, 758-62 (D. Md. 1976) (otherwise qualified entrant lacked
necessary technical expertise for de novo entry).
17 See, e.g., United States v. Marine Bancorporation, Inc., 418 U.S. 602 (1974).Justice White
observed that the majority's theory regarding legal barriers to alternative entry into the
banking industry could be equally applied to economic barriers. Id. at 654 n.5 (White, J.,
dissenting).
46 See, e.g., United States v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 410 U.S. 526, 553-54 (1973) (Marshall,
J., concurring); United States v. Penn-Olin Chem. Co., 378 U.S. 158, 166-67 (1964); FTC v.
Atlantic Richfield Co., 549 F.2d 289, 295 (4th Cir. 1977).
49 Compare FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568, 572, 579 (1967) (liquid bleach
advertising a factor); General Foods Corp. v. FTC, 386 F.2d 936, 938, 945 (3d Cir. 1967), cert.
denied, 391 U.S. 919 (1968) (scouring pad advertising a factor), with United States v. Hughes
Tool Co., 415 F. Supp. 637, 644 (C.D. Cal. 1976) (advertising a factor in sale of consumer
goods, but not in sale of industrial tools, which are distinguishable on the basis of quality and
performance).
50 See, e.g., Ford Motor Co. v. United States, 405 U.S. 562, 571 (1972) (Autolite's reputation
important in automotive aftermarket); United States v. Crowell, Collier & Macmillan, Inc.,
361 F. Supp. 983, 999, 1004 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (publishing company not a viable potential
entrant into musical field, in which established reputation is all important).
51 See, e.g., United States v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 410 U.S. 526, 552 n,7 (1973) (Marshall,
J., concurring) (established distribution system critical in beer industry); United States v. Black
& Decker Mfg. Co., 430 F. Supp. 729, 763-65 (D. Md. 1976) (existing distribution and service
network for power tools would aid entry into gasoline-powered chain saw market).
52 If an acquiring company has sufficient assets to purchase a major market competitor, it
will also have sufficient assets to acquire a toehold firm and, assuming the absence of special
market barriers, to establish a de novo entrant. Thus, the acquiring firm's resources are
primarily relevant to determination of its ability to overcome the obstacles to successful
development of a new major competitor from an initial toehold or de novo position. See, e.g.,
Kennecott Copper Corp. v. FTC, 467 F.2d 67 (10th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 909 (1974)
(example of acquiring company with enormous capital surplus attempting entry into high
technology coal industry).
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present a significant obstacle to a company with massive resources; in
other situations, the lack of such expertise may be so important as to
override the almost uniquely appropriate marketing and distributional
abilities of the acquiring company.
53
Normally, it should be easier to demonstrate de novo entry capability if
the proposed merger is into an adjacent geographic area rather than into
a related product market. An acquiring company already operating in a
particular product market may possess advantageous access to data con-
cerning operational costs and profitability, as well as the technological and
administrative skills required for successful marketing and distribution of
the product over an expanded market area. Similarly, an established
reputation in an industry may provide easier access to expansion capital
and aid in formation of a distributional network. The nature of a particu-
lar product may also provide economic incentives for an expanded mar-
ket, through benefits of increased prestige, improved advertising and
marketing capabilities, and better allocation of risk.54 The pattern of
expansion followed by the acquiring company in the past may provide
some general indication of both the company's ability to attempt particu-
lar types of market entry and its willingness to do so.
5 5
When the alternative entry asserted to be available is by toehold-the
acquisition and subsequent expansion of a smaller market competitor-
the courts must initially make an attempt to identify suitable takeover
candidates within the target market.5 6 Few criteria have been articulated
for the identification of such companies; existing precedents display a
predominantly case by case approach. Market share is clearly critical,
although little consensus exists as to the maximum permissible share for a
"toehold" position. In The Bendix Corporation,5 7 the Federal Trade Com-
mission challenged the acquisition by Bendix, a large, diversified man-
ufacturer of components for the aerospace and automotive industries, of
Fram, the third largest manufacturer of automotive and aircraft filters. In
its decision requiring Bendix to divest itself of Fram-which held 12.5%
of one filter market and 17.2% of another, narrower filter market-the
" See United States v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 430 F. Supp. 729 (D. Md. 1976); cf. United
States v. Wilson Sporting Goods Co., 288 F. Supp. 543, 561 (N.D. Ill. 1968) (absence of any
special technological barriers to entry into gymnastic equipment market by producer of
sporting goods).
'4 See, e.g., United States v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 410 U.S. 526, 529 (1973) (pressure on
regional brewer to compete nationally).
15 See United States v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 410 U.S. 526, 552 (1973) (Marshall, J.,
concurring); FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568, 580 (1967). Compare United States
v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 367 F. Supp. 1226, 1239-42 (C.D. Cal. 1973), aff'd per curiam, 418
U.S. 906 (1974) (past history of expansion, acquiring firm held potential entrant), with
United States v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 297 F. Supp. 1061, 1070 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), aff'd mer.
sub nom. Bartlett v. United States, 401 U.S. 986 (1971) (lack of past history significant in
finding that acquiring company not a likely potential entrant).
56 See generally Note, The Budd Co.: The Toehold Defense to a Section 7 Attack, 71 Nw. U.L.
Rev. 264 (1976); Note, Toehold Acquisitions and the Potential Competition Doctrine, 40 U.
Chi. L. Rev. 156 (1972).
57 77 F.T.C. 731 (1970), rev'd on other grounds, 450 F.2d 534 (6th Cir. 1971).
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Commission suggested in dicta that acquisition by Bendix of the Wix
Company, which held only 9.5% of its own filter market, would have been
permissible as a toehold alternative. 58 In a later decision, The Budd Com-
pany,59 the Commission initially sought to prohibit a proposed merger
between Budd, one of the nation's largest independent automotive
suppliers, and Gindy Corporation, which, as the fourth largest manufac-
turer of van trailers, held between six and eight percent of the trailer
market. In later dismissing the complaint, the Commission announced a
"ten percent rule," stating that companies such as Gindy that had market
shares less than ten percent would presumptively be treated as toehold
candidates. 60 The Commission in Budd, however, was careful to point out
that the rule created only a rebuttable presumption; in taking this posi-
tion, the Commission relied upon United States v. Phillips Petroleum Co.,"' in
which a toehold defense was rejected even though the acquired company
held only seven percent of the California retail gasoline market. The
Commission distinguished Phillips on the ground that the acquiring com-
pany in that case had not, as required under toehold theory, either
needed or made use of the acquired company "as a small base from which
to expand its operations.""2
Other factors relevant to determination of toehold status include indus-
try concentration level 63 and market definition6 4 as well as any evidence of
the past history of the toehold company as a growing or aggressive
competitor. To a large extent, the factors for evaluation of toehold entry
will obviously parallel those for de novo entry. In United States v. Black &
11 Id. at 819-24.
59 86 F.T.C. 518 (1975), noted in 89 Harv. L. Rev. 800 (1976).
" Id. at 582. The Budd rule also required that the market be characterized by the presence
of four or fewer firms holding 60% of the market. A slightly different ten percent rule, under
which four firms must control a 75% market share, is endorsed in Department of Justice,
Merger Guidelines 18 (1975), reprinted in 1 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 4510 (1975). An earlier
Federal Trade Commission staff report defines toehold companies as those with "market
shares of under five percent in industries with a four-firm concentration ratio over 60%."
Federal Trade Commission, Staff Report, Conglomerate Merger Performance: An Empirical
Analysis of Nine Corporations 132 (Nov. 1972).
01 367 F. Supp. 1226 (C.D. Cal. 1973), affd per curiam, 418 U.S. 906 (1974).
02 The Budd Co., 86 F.T.C. at 582 n.8 (quoting United States v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 367
F. Supp. at 1258).
63 Note the difference in required concentration levels between the Budd case and the
Justice Department's guidelines. See Department of Justice, supra note 60. It is obviously
important to distinguish a situation in which an acquired firm has 10% of the market and the
two largest firms have 45% and 40% market shares, from one in which the acquired firm also
has a 10% share but the two largest firms have 20% and 15%. In the former situation it is more
likely that the acquisition would be procompetitive; the considerably smaller firm might need
additional capital or other resources to be an effective competitor.
14 Market definition is critical to calculation of market share. In Budd, the defendant and
the government disagreed sharply over whether the market should be measured by cross-
elasticity of production or cross-elasticity of demand and calculated the acquired company's
market share as 8.4% and 16% respectively. The Commission, contrary to the usual procedure
in horizontal merger cases, relied primarily upon the cross-elasticity of production approach
and thus the 8.4% market share figure. See 86 F.T.C. at 571-72 & n.2; see 89 Harv. L. Rev. 800,
807-12 (1976).
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Decker Manufacturing Co.,6 5 for example, the district court accepted the
defendant's argument that several proposed toehold alternatives should
be rejected as lacking technological and manufacturing skills necessary to
the defendant's success in a new product market." In some situations,
however, the criteria for the two types of entry will differ; in the sale of
musical instruments, for example, an established reputation may be criti-
cal to effective competition, thus making de novo entry extremely difficult
but not necessarily foreclosing toehold entry through acquisition of a
small but prestigious firm.6 1 In addition, identification of toehold candi-
dates involves problems of definition not present in evaluation of de novo
entry. It is not yet clear whether subsidiaries of other conglomerates or
small firms actively resisting takeover should be included within the scope
of inquiry for "available" toehold companies. Similarly, the courts have
not established whether an acquiring firm must make good faith offers to
all available toehold candidates prior to entry by large scale acquisition.
To some extent, recent decisions appear to have misplaced the proper
focus of inquiry under the toehold alternative approach. Clearly, the
inquiry should not be whether the challenged acquisition is the defen-
dant's preferred method of entry, but rather whether the acquiring com-
pany could reasonably be expected to proceed by toehold in the absence
of merger. If a reasonable basis exists for believing that toehold entry
would have been attempted, a court should prohibit the proposed
merger. The courts should consider the available smaller company not
merely as a merger partner equivalent to full scale market entry, but as
one carrying sufficient independent benefits to justify its treatment as a
preferable alternative.
(c) Immediacy of Alternative Entry. In BOC International Ltd. v. FTC,8 the
Second Circuit faced the question of how immediate an available avenue
of entry need be to qualify as a feasible alternative under the actual
potential entrant doctrine. 9 In the BOC case, the world's second largest
producer of industrial gases acquired Airco, the third largest American
industrial gases producer. Because of BOC's position in the world market,
and because BOC had not previously produced or sold industrial gases
6' 430 F. Supp. 729 (D. Md. 1976).
6 Id. at 766-67 & n.69.
6 See United States v. Crowell, Collier & Macmillan, Inc., 361 F. Supp. 983, 988 (S.D.N.Y.
1973).
68 557 F.2d 24 (2d Cir. 1977).
69 In Marine Bancorporation, the defendants had argued that one proposed toehold candi-
date could not have been acquired, because of state banking law requirements, until four years
after the date of the challenged merger, and that this firm was thus not "available" for
alternative entry. See 418 U.S. at 638. The Supreme Court found it unnecessary to give this
claim serious consideration because the Court concluded that the candidate, even if in fact
available, could not have created the kind of long-term structural benefits to the target market
required for application of the actual potential entrant doctrine. See id. at 638-39; text
accompanying notes 83-84 infra. Because of the time consumed in the various appeals,
acquisition of the toehold candidate would have been possible under state law one year after
the Supreme Court decision in Marine Bancorporation.
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within the United States, the Federal Trade Commission argued that the
company qualified as an actual potential entrant into the concentrated
American gas market. The Commission based its position upon a finding
that "there was a 'reasonable probability' that BOC would have eventually
entered the U.S. industrial gases market by internal expansion, or its
equivalent, but for the acquisition of Airco."70 The court of appeals,
however, found such a standard legally insufficient under section 7 of the
Clayton Act and refused to enjoin the merger.7 Instead, the court held
that the Commission must prove not only that the acquiring company had
the incentive and capability for alternative entry, but also that the alterna-
tive route was one that the company would have followed in the rea-
sonably foreseeable future.
72
Although it made no attempt to identify a reasonable period of time for
alternative entry, the BOC court considered the Commission's reliance
upon "eventual" entry at some unspecified future date "wholly specula-
tive" and obviously insufficient. 73 Whatever guidelines are eventually es-
tablished in practice, a standard such as that applied in BOC of requiring
a relatively immediate probability of entry will add another significant
obstacle to application of the actual potential entrant doctrine.7 4 It is clear
that determination of a "reasonable probability" of the "substantial lessen-
ing of competition" involves elements of prediction and speculation. Far
less clear, however, is the magnitude of the additional burden imposed by
combining with the speculative projection of future events, inherent in all
potential competition theory, an additional requirement of proof that the
projected event will occur in the "immediate" future.
(d) Subjective Versus Objective Evidence. Closely intertwined with consid-
eration of capability and incentive for alternative entry is the question of
what type of evidence is acceptable for measurement of the probability of
alternative entry. In making this determination, courts can look either to
the actual motivation of the acquiring company's corporate officers or to
objective evidence, that is, to facts indicating what a reasonable corporate
70 In re British Oxygen Co., 86 F.T.C. 1241, 1360 (1975), quoted in BOC Int'l Ltd. v. FTC,
557 F.2d at 28 (emphasis added).
71 BOC Int'l Ltd. v. FTC, 557 F.2d at 28-29.
72 Id. at 29.
73 Id. Compare the immediate alternative entry requirement imposed in BOC with the
approach in United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586, 597-98 (1957)
(vertical merger), in which the Supreme Court permitted the government to bring suit to
challenge the acquisition of a 23% share of General Motors stock by du Pont even though the
claimed competitive injuries that formed the basis for the government's case had occurred
more than 30 years after the acquisition was consummated.
Prior cases under § 7 were brought at or near the time of acquisition .... None of these
cases holds, or even suggests, that the Government is foreclosed from bringing the action
at any time when a threat of the prohibited effects is evident.
Id. at 598 (citations omitted).
14 This problem could be alleviated in cases involving the FTC if the Commission devel-
oped a practice of including in its complaint concrete statements regarding the number of
years within which entry is to be expected. It could be argued that it was the Commission's
failure to be more definite in the BOC case that invited reversal by the Second Circuit.
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executive would do in light of relevant economic and business consid-
erations. In 1973, four members of the Supreme Court apparently were
prepared to place heavy emphasis on subjective evidentiary factors. In
United States v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 75 a plurality of the Court accepted
the district court's reliance upon testimony of corporate officers as a basis
for determination that Falstaff would not have entered the New England
beer market de novo. 76 As an additional barrier to regulation of conglom-
erate mergers, such an approach is distressing. Strictly adopted, it would
require plaintiffs to offer evidence that the management of an acquiring
company in fact gave serious consideration to alternative forms of entry as
realistic options in the absence of merger. 77 There are, however, often
enormous and highly visible advantages to merger with a large firm,
including established market position, reduced risk and developed tech-
nological skills. In contrast, toehold or de novo entry may entail a weak or
nonexistent distributional network, limited financial resources, technolog-
ical barriers and, ultimately, unpredictable potential for growth.7 8 The
obvious nature of the advantages of merger with a large, established firm
makes it improbable that an acquiring corporation would have been
75 410 U.S. 526 (1973).
70 See id. at 532-33 (plurality opinion) (White, J.). The four members of the Court who
accepted the district court's finding with respect to de novo entry remanded for consideration
of the applicability of perceived potential entrant doctrine, id., and two other Justices con-
curred in the result. Id. at 538 (Douglas, J., concurring); id. at 545 (Marshall, J., concurring).
Compare the reliance on more comprehensive objective evidence in United States v. Phillips
Petroleum Co., 367 F. Supp. 1226, 1238-39 (C.D. Cal. 1973) (concluding, after examination of
objective factors, that the acquiring company would have entered by alternate means), aff'd
mem., 418 U.S. 906 (1974), and United States v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 430 F. Supp. 729,
772 (D. Md. 1976) (concluding, after examination of objective factors, that the acquiring
company would not have entered by alternate means).
71 The demand for definite evidence that top management considered toehold entry a
sound alternative to the acquisition under attack may have reached its zenith in FTC v.
Atlantic Richfield Co., 549 F.2d 289 (4th Cir. 1977). The FTC challenged the acquisition by
Arco, a major petroleum refiner-distributor, of The Anaconda Company, the nation's third
largest copper refiner. The Commission argued that Arco could have, and would have,
entered the copper industry de novo if the merger were set aside. Despite evidence of Arco's
interest and capacity to enter the copper mining industry and documents by lower level
managerial personnel recommending entry by various means, the circuit court held the
evidence insufficient to characterize Arco as an actual potential entrant:
While the proof thus shows a continuing interest on the part of Arco in the copper
industry and continuing studies as to the best means of entry, it fails to show a signicant
commitment at the decisional level that Arco was seriously considering original entry into the
copper markets or entry by toehold acquisition.
Id. at 296-97 (emphasis added). In a footnote, the court added: "We think there is a funda-
mental distinction between suggestions and ideas advanced by lower-level management that
grass roots entry into copper was advisable and a commitment by the company to that type of
diversification." Id. at 296 n.9.
78 "It takes years to build a new business, and we want to get there a little quicker than that."
."In some fields you probably couldn't start a new business from scratch because there
are too many competitors already out there."
Furthermore, with stock prices depressed, "it is cheaper to buy existing assets than to
build a new plant-it's as simple as that.... And your chances of success are higher." ...
"With new product development, there is a risk that you don't have in an acquisition with
a proven product."
Winter, supra note 10, at 1, col. 6 (comments of corporate officers).
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favorably persuaded by a full scale investigation of available methods of
alternative entry made prior to merger. Moreover, the possibilities for
manipulation and manufacture of evidence under the subjective approach
are manifest. 79 As Justice Marshall indicated in his concurring opinion in
Falstaff, such evidence, although of some value in actual potential entrant
cases, is inherently suspect as biased and self-serving.80 Given the circum-
stances, it is hardly surprising that an acquiring company would offer
evidence that it had in fact considered and rejected alternatives to large
firm merger."'
3. Alternative Entry Likely to Lead to Eventual Deconcentration
Proof that entry by the challenged merger would produce immediate
anticompetitive effects within the target market is not required under the
actual potential entrant doctrine.12 Instead, the merger is prohibited be-
cause it forecloses an alternative form of entry that, if allowed, would
itself help to deconcentrate the particular market and thus improve com-
petition. Although the Supreme Court acknowledged in Marine Bancorpo-
T See Davidow, Conglomerate Concentration and Section Seven: The Limitations of the
Anti-Merger Act, 68 Colum. L. Rev. 1231, 1245-46 (1968) (role of corporate attorneys in
manipulation of evidence); Turner, Conglomerate Mergers and Section 7 of the Clayton Act,
78 Harv. L. Rev. 1313, 1383 (1965).
'1 United States v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 410 U.S. at 564-66 (Marshall, J., concurring).
A defendant in a § 7 case such as this wishes to enter the market by acquisition and its
managers know that its ability to do so depends upon whether it can convince a court that
it would not have entered de novo if entry by acquisition were prevented. It is thus strongly
in management's interest to represent that it has no intention of entering de novo-a
representation which is not subject to external verification and which is so speculative in
nature that it could virtually never serve as the predicate for a perjury charge.
Moreover, in a case where the objective evidence strongly favors entry de novo, a firm
which asks us to believe that it does not intend to enter de novo by implication asks us to
believe that it does not intend to act in its own economic self-interest. But corporations
are, after all, profit-making institutions, and, absent special circumstances, they can be
expected to follow courses of action most likely to maximize profits.
Id. at 568 (footnote omitted). Justice Marshall provided an example of the extent to which a
company's protestations that it would never have entered the market de novo indeed are.
self-serving and unreliable: "When the Government challenged Bethlehem Steel's acquisition
of Youngstown Steel in a § 7 proceeding [in the 1950s), Bethlehem vigorously argued that it
would never enter the Midwestern steel market de novo. But when the merger was disallowed
.. Bethlehem nonetheless elected to make a de novo entry." Id. at 568 n.20 (citation omitted).
A further example is provided by a study that indicated that, after thirteen banks had been
denied approval for proposed mergers by the New York State regulatory authorities, ten of
those banks later entered the target market de novo. Kohn & Carlo, Potential Competition:
Unfounded Faith or Pragmatic Foresight?- (N.Y. St. Banking Dep't, March 1970). But see
Rhoades & Yeats, An Evaluation of Recent Evidence Advanced in Support of the Potential
Competition Doctrine, 19 Antitrust Bull. 543 (1974) (challenging significance of Kohn & Carlo
data).
sI See Swennes, Three Theories of Potential Competition Under Section 7 of the Clayton
Act: Reaching the Conglomerate Merger, 49 Tul. L. Rev. 139, 153 (1974) (preference for
objective evidence); Note, The Potential Competition Doctrine After Marine Bancorporation, 63
Geo. L.J. 969, 987 (1975) (criticizing Falstaff approach); Note, United States v. Falstaff
Brewing Corporation: Potential Competition Re-examined, 72 Mich. L. Rev. 837, 854-57
(1974) (noting shortcomings of both subjective and objective evidence).
82 However, such proof, if in fact available, can form the basis of a section 7 conglomerate
merger challenge. See text accompanying note 123 infra.
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ration that, in theory, the test of alternative entry is whether the proposed
alternative "would be likely to produce deconcentration of the [target]
market over the long run or other procompetitive effects, ' 8 3 the Court in
practice looked to the long-term benefits of eventual deconcentration as a
virtually exclusive measure of procompetitive effect. The defendant, a
large Seattle bank, had attempted to enter the Spokane banking market
through acquisition of the third largest bank in that city. In challenging
the acquisition, the government argued, under the actual potential en-
trant doctrine, that the defendant could have entered the market through
a toehold acquisition or internal expansion. Because of severe restrictions
imposed upon branch banking in Washington, however, neither a new
bank nor an existing bank acquired by the defendant would have been
permitted to establish additional branches in the foreseeable future. The
defendant thus argued that it would have been impossible for a company
entering the Spokane market by de novo or toehold means to expand its
market share to a level sufficient to produce a procompetitive influence
on the market. The Supreme Court, looking only to the reasonable
probability of eventual deconcentration, agreed with the defendant's ap-
proach and thus rejected the government's challenge .
4
In so doing, the Court foreclosed consideration of other relevant forms
of procompetitive effect peculiar to de novo and toehold entry. As the
Court acknowledged, 5 a generalized insistence upon significant decon-
centration as the only permissible indicator of procompetitive effect
would have been inconsistent with past decisions involving other indus-
tries.8 6 However, the Supreme Court justified the result reached in Marine
Bancorporation by reference to the presence of extensive regulatory control
in the Washington banking industry. 7 Such a line of reasoning, based
solely upon the limitations on branch banking in the Spokane market,
ignores the potential for procompetitive influence of even small additional
participants in a highly concentrated market. As a new entrant into such a
market increases its production capacity and begins to compete aggres-
sively for a larger market share, the result will be at least a short-term
increase in supply and decrease in price. The company may offer an
expanded or improved range of services or develop more effective mar-
keting techniques, forcing existing competitors to adjust their practices
correspondingly. At the same time, the mere increase in the number of
83 418 U.S. at 633 (emphasis added).
84 See id. at 636-38.
85 See id. at 637 & n.43 (citing United States v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 410 U.S. 526 (1973),
and FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568 (1967)).
88 See United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 377 U.S. 271 (1964) (Court held illegal
merger involving acquisition of company with 1.3% market share in market 76% of which
was held by five companies and 95.7% by nine companies; important to maintain indepen-
dent and innovative "maverick" in aluminum conductor industry). "As [oligopoly] develops
the greater is the likelihood that parallel policies of mutual advantage, not competition, will
emerge. That tendency may well be thwarted by the presence of small but significant
competitors." Id. at 280.
87 See 418 U.S. at 637-39.
CHALLENGING CONGLOMERATE MERGERS
firms operating within the market may make effective horizontal collusion
more difficult to establish. s8
The failure of the Court in Marine Bancorporation to consider alternative
forms of procompetitive effect obviously makes successful application of
the actual potential entrant doctrine more difficult. Rarely can it be said
with any certainty that a particular de novo or toehold acquisition will
result in a major new market competitor. More typically, the new entrant
will have staked out, after a few years, a small market position from which
it exercises a limited, but nonetheless significant, influence on competi-
tion. In the face of such realities, complete dismissal of the limited com-
petitive effects of small competitors can result only in ultimate rejection of
the actual potential entrant doctrine.8 9
4. Prospects for Application of the Actual Potential Entrant Doctrine
Although accepted by several lower courts9" and by the majority of legal
commentators, 9 the actual potential entrant doctrine has not yet been
embraced by the Supreme Court. In both Marine Bancorporation and the
earlier Falstaff decision, the Court expressly declined to consider whether
the doctrine could ever provide an independent and exclusive basis for
invalidation of a merger. 92 In accordance with the language of section 7
88 See Robinson, Antitrust Developments: 1973, 74 Colum. L. Rev. 163, 184 (1974);
Turner, supra note 79, at 1383-84.
[T]he problem of proving that the new entrant would have been a substantial competitive
factor can be overstated. It is highly likely that a new entrant in the kind of industry we
are talking about-a tight oligopoly industry-will shake things up a great deal in the
process of trying to acquire a substantial market share, even if in the end its inroads are
rather modest. It is at least arguable that the probability of a substantial lessening of
competition for a period of time is enough for section 7 to be invoked, even though the
eventual impact is more problematical.
Id. at 1383 (Footnote omitted) (argument made in context of comparison between de novo
entry and entry by merger with established large firm, but effects presumably equally likely in
case of toehold entry by major acquiring firm).
89 This will obviously be particularly true in the area of bank mergers. See Horsley, Marine
Bancorporation, Connecticut National Bank and Potential Competition: A Critique, 55 B.U.L.
Rev. 3, 17 (1975).
90 Kennecott Copper Corp. v. FTC, 467 F.2d 67, 74-79 (10th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 416
U.S. 909 (1974); Ekco Prods. Co. v. FTC, 347 F.2d 745, 752-53 (7th Cir. 1965); United States
v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 367 F. Supp. 1226, 1234 (C.D. Cal. 1973),aff'dper curiam, 418 U.S.
906 (1974); United States v. Wilson Sporting Goods Co., 288 F. Supp. 543, 562-63 (N.D. Ill.
1968); United States v. Joseph Schlitz Brewing Co., 253 F. Supp. 129 (N.D. Cal.), aff'd mem.,
385 U.S. 37 (1966).
9 See, e.g., Fox, Toehold Acquisitions, Potential Toehold Acquisitions, and Section 7 of the
Clayton Act, 42 Antitrust L.J. 573, 579 (1973); Robinson, supra note 88, at 183 n.139 (1974);
Turner, supra note 79, at 1379-80; Note, supra note 81, 63 Geo. L.J. at 972 n. 13. But see Rahl,
Applicability of the Clayton Act to Potential Competition, 12 ABA Antitrust Section 128, 143
(1958).
92 Because we remand for proper assessment of Falstaff as an on-the-fringe potential
competitor, it is not necessary to reach the question of whether § 7 bars a market-
extension merger by a company whose entry into the market would have no influence
whatsoever on the present state of competition in the market-that is, the entrant will not
be a dominant force in the market andhas no current influence in the marketplace. We
leave for another day the question of the applicability of § 7 to a merger that will leave
competition in the marketplace exactly as it was, neither hurt nor helped, and that is
challengeable under § 7 only on grounds that the company could, but did not, enter de
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of the Clayton Act, which refers to acquisitions that serve "substantially to
lessen competition, ' 9 3 courts have traditionally tested the legality of mer-
gers by reference to the merger's own potential for anticompetitive impact
upon a particular market. 94 In contrast, the actual potential entrant doc-
trine is concerned with the loss of the potentially procompetitive impact of
entry other than by merger. Application of the doctrine thus raises a
conceptual issue regarding the meaning of "lessening" competition under
the Clayton Act. Although a strict interpretation of the term might sug-
gest the incompatibility of the Act's language and the actual potential
entrant doctrine, such a conclusion would be inconsistent with the intent
and spirit of section 7, which was amended in 1950 at least in part to
ensure coverage of conglomerate mergers. 95 The statute requires a com-
parison between the level of competition prevailing in the absence of
merger and the level after merger. If the latter is "substantially less" than
the former in a particular case, the merger should be proscribed. A
present change of market structure-the merger-that forecloses future
market improvement in the form of alternative entry can indeed be said
to have "lessened" competition."
novo or through "toe-hold" acquisition and that there is less competition than there would
have been had entry been in such a manner.
United States v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 410 U.S. at 537; accord, United States v. Marine
Bancorporation, Inc., 418 U.S. at 625 & n.28 (quoting Falstaff).
93 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1970), as amended, Act of Sept. 30, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-435, § 201, 90
Stat. 1383.
94 See text accompanying note 15 supra.
95 See Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 317 & n.31 (1962) (citing H.R. Rep.
No. 1191, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1949)).
96 One means of avoiding the statutory construction problem would involve asserting that
conglomerate mergers may "tend to create a monopoly" even if they do not technically "lessen
competition" within the meaning of section 7, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1970), as amended, Pub. L. No.
94-435, § 201, 90 Stat. 1383 (1976). An argument could be made that "monopoly" under
section 7 is not synonymous with "monopoly" under the Sherman Act, id. § 2, but rather refers
to market conditions that have the economic characteristics of a monopoly. To the extent that
a merger contributes to the perpetuation of an oligopoly, it results in the same type of effects,
such as higher prices and restricted supplies, that occur when one or more market competitors
participate in a monopoly.
Another approach would involve reliance upon section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission
Act, id. § 45(a)(2), which makes unlawful "unfair methods of competition." On a number of
occasions, the Supreme Court has held that this provision reaches antitrust violations at their
incipient stages, thus proscribing conduct that is not itself violative of the Sherman or Clayton
Acts. See FTC v. Brown Shoe Co., 384 U.S. 316, 320-22 (1966); FTC v. Motion Picture Adv.
Serv. Co., 344 U.S. 392, 394-95 (1953); Fashion Originators' Guild v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457, 466
(1941).
The Federal Trade Commission usually brings merger cases under both sections 5 and 7
and has not argued that section 5 extends to situations not covered by section 7. In future
cases, however, the Commission might argue that mergers that foreclose the possibility of
future improvements to competition are, at a minimum, "unfair methods of competition"
under section 5. Cf. FTC Opinion & Order, In re Perpetual Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 846
Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) F-l (No. 9083, Dec. 6, 1977) (interlocking directorates
attacked solely under § 5, no Clayton Act § 8 claim). Two judicial opinions, however, have
questioned whether section 5 would add any scope to an FTC merger challenge. See FTC v.
Consolidated Foods Corp., 380 U.S. 592, 601 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring) (implication that
§ 5 less expansive in coverage than § 7); FTC v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 549 F.2d 289, 291 n.1
(4th Cir. 1977) (no authority for claim that merger could violate § 5 in absence of violation of §
7).
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B. Perceived Potential Entrant Theory
Actual potential entrant theory concentrates upon the loss of potential
market enhancement, as yet unrealized, that might have occurred at the
time of some future de novo or toehold market entry. Perceived potential
entrant theory looks instead to benefits already being conferred upon the
acquired firm's market prior to the challenged merger. According to this
theory, the mere presence of the acquiring firm at the edge of an
oligopolistic target market will cause competitors within that market to
adjust their production and marketing strategies so as to discourage the
acquirer from attempting de novo or toehold entry, if those competitors
perceive such entry as a realistic threat.9 7 With an eye toward the potential
entrant, market participants may engage in "limit pricing" 9gs-the practice
of maintaining market prices just below an entry-triggering level. 99 Simi-
lar results may also be achieved through more subtle defensive tactics,
such as product and service improvement or expansion of production
capacity, intended to serve as both psychological and economic deterrents
to entry.
If a section 5 approach were feasible, the FTC might also be able to proceed through
rulemaking. At least one court has held that the Commission can promulgate substantive rules
to define "unfair methods of competition." National Petroleum Refiners Ass'n v. FTC, 482
F.2d 672 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 951 (1974). Compare Magnuson-Moss Act §
202(a)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 57a(a)(1) (Supp. V 1975) (specifically giving FTC the authority to
promulgate substantive rules defining "unfair or deceptive acts or practices"), with
Magnuson-Moss Act § 202(a)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 57a(a)(2) (Supp. V 1975) (leaving unchanged
whatever authority the FTC might have had under the original 1914 Act to promulgate rules
defining "unfair methods of competition"). To the extent that the FTC does have this
rulemaking authority, it might promulgate rules declaring, for example, mergers of com-
panies of greater than a certain size to be violations of section 5 of the FTC Act. See also 858
Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) at A-9 (Apr. 6, 1978) (speech of A. Dougherty, Dir., FTC
Bureau of Competition).
" See United States v. Penn-,Olin Chem. Co., 378 U.S. 158, 173-74 (1964) (application of
perceived potential entrant theory to proposed joint venture): "The existence of an aggres-
sive, well equipped and well financed corporation engaged in the same or related lines of
commerce waiting anxiously to enter an oligopolistic market would be a substantial incentive
to competition which cannot be underestimated."
The Supreme Court expressly approved application of the perceived potential entrant
theory to conglomerate mergers in United States v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 410 U.S. at
532-36. Although the theory is usually discussed in terms of a perceived threat of de novo
entry, it would be equally applicable with respect to toehold entry by a fringe firm with
substantial resources; after takeover, the fringe firm could challenge existing firms by its drive
to expand the toehold's share of the market.
" See generally J. Bain, Barriers to New Competition (1956); Dunfee & Stern, supra note 27,
at 835-43; Markovits, Potential Competition, Limit Price Theory, and the Legality of Horizon-
tal and Conglomerate Mergers Under the American Antitrust Laws, 1975 Wis. L. Rev. 658;
Note, supra note 56, 40 U. Chi. L. Rev. at 167-75.
99 The entry-triggering determinant is the price level that the potential entrant believes will
prevail in the target market after entry, and not the price level prevailing prior to entry. Thus,
limit pricing will be attempted only in those situations in which existing competitors expect the
potential entrant to accept the limit price as reflective of actual post-entry prices. See Note,
supra note 81, 72 Mich. L. Rev. at 848-49. A more realistic enforcement approach, however,
might involve challenging mergers into markets in which present market participants have
been seeking a "limit return." In such markets, entry has presumably been triggered by the
fringe firm's perception of supra-normal industry profits and its expectation that such profits
would continue to prevail even after entry.
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The procompetitive influence of these tactics is obviously lost if a per-
ceived potential entrant in fact enters the target market through merger
with an established market competitor. Thus, entry by the perceived
entrant is prohibited because the firm, merely by virtue of its position at
the edge of the market, has a positive effect upon competition within the
market.1 00 As under the actual potential entrant theory, however, the
acquired company's market must be concentrated and thus less than fully
competitive:1 01 the presence of one or more potential entrants can have
no effect upon competition at the edge of a market in which goods and
services are already being provided at optimum levels. 10 2 Furthermore,
courts construing the perceived potential entrant theory have imposed
three other requirements: (1) that companies within the target market
actually perceive the acquiring firm as a potential entrant; (2) that they
moderate their conduct in response to that perception; and (3) that the
acquiring firm be one of a limited number of potential entrants.
1. Requirement That the Acquiring Company Be Perceived
as an Entrant
The requirement that firms within the target market actually perceive
an acquirer as a potential entrant illustrates the conceptual difficulties that
accompany application of the perceived potential entrant theory. Ideally,
the criteria for identification of potential entrants should coincide under
both branches of the potential competition doctrine: those companies that
are perceived as likely entrants by market participants should also be actual
potential entrants. In practice, however, both potential entrants and
target market competitors are under the control of fallible managers of
varying business acumen, with resulting divergence between market per-
ceptions and actual business practice.
One possible basis for identification of perceived potential entrants
would be the type of subjective evidence that received implicit approval
for actual potential entrant theory in Falstaff. t 0 3 In briefly summarizing
106 "Potential competition ... as a substitute for ... [actual competition] may restrain
producers from overcharging those to whom they sell or underpaying those from whom
they buy.... Potential competition, insofar as the threat survives [as it would have here in
the absence of Penn-Olin], may compensate in part for the imperfection characteristic of
actual competition in the great majority of competitive markets."
United States v. Penn-Olin Chem. Co., 378 U.S. 158, 174 (1964) (quoting Wilcox, Competition
and Monopoly in American Industry, TNEC Monograph No. 21, at 7-8 (1940)).
There may be some situations in which a company is more valuable as a threat at the market
fringe than as an actual market competitor. See Ford Motor Co. v. United States, 405 U.S. 562,
567-68 (1972) (quoting district court findings). But see Dunfee & Stern, supra note 27, at 862
(discussion of situations in which perceived entrant on market fringe might have anticompeti-
tive influence).
... See United States v. Marine Bancorporation, Inc., 418 U.S. at 624-25; text accompany-
ing note 25 supra.
102 See FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. at 593-94 (Harlan, J., concurring) (limit
pricing not relevant so long as competition is itself sufficient to keep market prices below
entry-triggering levels).
"I See text accompanying note 76 supra.
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the requirements for application of the perceived potential entrant
theory, Justice White stated in Falstaff that evidence of the actual inten-
tions of the acquiring firm is not "irrelevant or... to be looked upon with
suspicion," but it is also "not necessarily the last word" with respect to
proof of perceived potential entrant status.10 4 Justice Marshall was more
critical, however, asserting in his concurring opinion that the use of such
evidence is even less justifiable as a basis for identification of perceived
entrants than actual entrants:
The perceived potential entrant exerts a procompetitive effect be-
cause companies in the market perceive it as a potential entrant. The
companies in the market may entertain this perception whether the
perceived potential entrant is in fact a potential entrant or not. Thus,
a firm on the fringe of the market may exert a procompetitive effect
even if it has no intention of entering the market, so long as it seems
to those within the market that it may have such an intention. It
follows that subjective testimony by the managers of the perceived
potential entrants is irrelevant.
0 5
The actual perceptions of the officers of companies operating within
the target market regarding the probable intentions of the acquiring firm
are, although similarly "subjective," obviously relevant to perceived poten-
tial entrant status.' However, serious doubts as to the reliability of such
evidence suggest that it would be unsuitable as a substantial independent
basis for application of the perceived potential entrant theory. Testimony
from market firms may reflect the same self-serving qualities that charac-
terized the evidence of the acquiring firm's officers; the phenomenon of
limit pricing that underlies the perceived potential entrant theory itself
presupposes the desire of market competitors to discourage entry by the
acquiring firm." 7 Moreover, the unreliability inherent in all testimony of
104 United States v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 410 U.S. at 535-36. The district court on
remand in Falstaff construed Justice White's opinion to authorize a two-part test, involving
both subjective and objective evidence. See United States v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 383 F.
Supp. 1020, 1023 (D.R.I. 1974) (judgment for defendant on remand). In United States v.
Phillips Petroleum Co., 367 F. Supp. at 1235-37, the court read language in Falstaff to favor
objective evidence over the subjective testimony of the officers of the acquiring firm. Cf.
United States v. Penn-Olin Chem. Co., 378 U.S. 158, 174 (1964) (joint venture) ("[p]otential
competition [in a perceived potential entrant case] cannot be put to a subjective test").
105 United States v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 410 U.S. at 564 (Marshall, J., concurring)
(footnotes omitted).
106 See id. at 534 n. 13 (White, J.) ("[t]he Government did not produce direct evidence of how
members of the New England market reacted to potential competition from Falstaff") (em-
phasis added).
107 See Missouri Portland Cement Co. v. Cargill, Inc., 498 F.2d 851, 860 n.13 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 883 (1974) (denial of preliminary injunction) (court dismissed testimony of
market competitors in brief footnote); accord, FTC v. Tenneco, Inc., 433 F. Supp. 105, 112
n. 18 (D.D.C. 1977). But see United States v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 430 F. Supp. at 770-71
(extensive use of evidence of subjective perception of market participants).
Although even more suspect as evidence, testimony of the surprise of officers of the friendly
merger target upon discovery of the acquiring company's intentions was found acceptable in
at least one instance. See Sterling Drug, Inc., 80 F.T.C. 477, 603 (1972). See also United States
v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 383 F. Supp. 1020, 1023 (D.R.I. 1974) (remand) (assertion by
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motivation can only be compounded in a survey of the subjective percep-
tions of the numerous competitors operating within the target market. 10 8
To the extent that they do behave rationally, market participants pre-
sumably base their perceptions regarding the risk of entry by additional
competitors upon analysis of incentives to entry, market barriers and
available toehold candidates. Justice White suggested in Falstaff that the
perceptions of participants be measured by an independent judicial eval-
uation of such factors to determine whether they would influence a
rational-rather than specific-firm within the target market to perceive
the acquiring firm as a potential entrant.1 0 9 This "rational business-
person" test makes possible reliance upon the same objective economic
and business considerations already before a court in those cases involving
claims under both the actual and perceived potential entrant theories and
addresses Justice Marshall's expressed concerns about the use of subjec-
tive evidence; moreover, this test has already been applied in several
lower court decisions. 10
Market perceptions might also be measured by analysis of price and
profit levels within the target market. Evidence that these levels were
lower than normally expected in an apparently oligopolistic market would
suggest the presence of limit pricing."' In effect, such an approach would
accept evidence of market response-limit pricing-as inferential proof of
market perception of the acquirer or similar firms as potential entrants.
However, determination of "normal" price and profit levels would be
difficult at best, and subnormal levels might merely indicate that a particu-
lar industry is already competitive, despite its concentrated structure.
former officers of merger target that the acquiring firm had been perceived as "no threat");
United States v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 367 F. Supp. at 1238-39; cf. text accompanying notes
75-81 supra (use of subjective evidence in actual potential entrant cases).
108 The potential for inconsistency in subjective market perception evidence is clearly
illustrated in Black & Decker, in which the opposing parties were able to assemble credible
testimony from industry sources supporting both sides of the market perception issue. See
United States v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 430 F. Supp. at 770-71.
109 The specific question with respect to this phase of the case is not what Falstaff's
internal company decisions were but whether, given its financial capabilities and condi-
tions in the New England market, it would be reasonable to consider it a potential entrant
into that market. Surely, it could not be said on this record that Falstaff's general interest
in the New England market was unknown; and if it would appear to rational beer
merchants in New En gland that Falstaff might well build a new brewery to supply the
northeastern market then its entry by merger becomes suspect under § 7. The District
Court should therefore have appraised the economic facts about Falstaff and the New
England market in order to determine whether in any realistic sense Falstaff could be said
to be a potential competitor on the fringe of the market with likely influence on existing
competition.
United States v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 410 U.S. at 533-34 (footnotes omitted).
110 See United States v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 430 F. Supp. at 769-73 (court relies upon
both subjective market perceptions and objective economic factors); accord, United States v.
Falstaff Brewing Corp., 383 F. Supp. 1020, 1023-24 (D.R.I. 1974) (remand); United States v.
Phillips PetrQleum Co., 367 F. Supp. at 1255-56.
"I Cf. R. Posner, Antitrust Law: An Economic Perspective 69-70 (1976) (discussion of
evidence of abnormally high industry profits as indicator of horizontal price fixing).
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2. Market Response as a Separate Requirement
At least one lower court has required proof of market response to the
company perceived at the market fringe as a separate and additional
precondition to application of the perceived potential entrant theory.1 12
Such a requirement ignores the significant difficulties inherent in direct
proof of market behavior-difficulties that have been reflected in the
dominant role of concentration as a surrogate in merger evaluation for
proof of the predicted effect.' 3 As indicated above, the specific response
evidence required under the perceived potential entrant theory-for ex-
ample, proof of "reasonable" prices and "appropriate" profit levels---may
be extremely difficult to establish. Furthermore, little agreement exists as
to whether the conduct hypothesized under this theory actually occurs in
practice, with the result that evidence of market response may not be
available.' 4 The absence of such evidence may be insignificant to evalua-
tion of market perceptions; however, because direct evidence of such
11 See United States v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 383 F. Supp. 1020 (D.R.I. 1974) (burden on
government to prove that probable result of perception of defendant as potential entrant
would be substantially to lessen competition). But see United States v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co.,
430 F. Supp. at 773 (government need not introduce evidence of actual market response);
United States v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 367 F. Supp. at 1257.
The Supreme Court, in Marine Bancorporation, seems to have considered proof of market
response to represent a separate precondition for application of the perceived potential
entrant doctrine:
In developing and applying [this theory], the Court has recognized that a market exten-
sion merger may be unlawful if the target market is substantially concentrated, if the
acquiring firm has the characteristics, capabilities, and economic incentive to render it a
perceived potential de novo entrant, and if the acquiring firm'spremerger presence on the
rringe of the target market in fact tempered oligopolistic behavior on the part of the existing
participants in that market.
418 U.S. at 624-25 (emphasis added). However, the precise question whether proof of market
response constitutes a separate precondition was not reached in the Marine Bancorporation
case, because the Court ultimately concluded that the market participants could not have even
perceived the defendant as a potential entrant into the Spokane market. See id. at 639-40. The
Court's approach to proof of competitive effect in past cases at least leaves open the possibility
that limit pricing behavior could be inferred from proof of market perceptions and concentra-
tion ratios in an appropriate case. See United States v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 410 U.S. at 534
n.13 ("[tihe Government did not produce direct evidence of how members of the New
England market reacted to potential competition from Falstaff, but circumstantial evidence is
the lifeblood of antitrust law") (citing, inter alia, Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research,
Inc., 395 U.S. 100 (1969), United States v. Penn-Olin Chem. Co., 378 U.S. 158 (1964), and
Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962)).
113 See, e.g., United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486, 496-97 (1973) (hori-
zontal merger) (proof of concentration by industry production data); United States v. Penn-
Olin Chem. Co., 378 U.S. 158, 176 (1964) (joint venture) (discussion of difficulties inherent in
proof of precise competitive effect of elimination of a potential entrant); United States v.
Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 362 (1963) (horizontal merger) ("relative economic
data . . . both complex and elusive").
114 Professor Markovits has argued that limit pricing seldom, if ever, occurs in practice. See
Markovits, supra note 98, at 666-90; accord, Dunfee & Stern, supra note 27, at 837-39, 851. See
also Berger & Peterson, supra note 37, at 495 ("conditions under which a recognized potential
entrant merger will reduce competition [are] rarely, if ever, met"). But see F. Scherer, Indus-
trial Market Structure and Economic Performance 215,225 (1970) (reaching contrary conclu-
sions).
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perceptions remains available, it suggests that a strict additional require-
ment of proof of market influence would in most cases entirely defeat
application of the perceived potential entrant theory.
3. Limited Number of Perceived Entrants
It is presumed under the perceived potential entrant theory that the
loss of a single potential entrant through merger will not significantly
reduce the procompetitive influence of a large number of similar entrants
poised at the edge of the target market.' 5 However, in most situations, it
is unilikely that an acquirer will be identifiable as the only perceived
potential entrant or even as one of a small group of such entrants.
Geographical factors may place constraints upon the class of available
entrants. In United States v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 116 for example, the
defendant was the fourth largest brewer in the United States, the largest
regional brewer in a product line in which there was an evident trend
toward nationwide production, and the regional brewer whose established
operations were closest to the New England market. In certain types of
product extension mergers, the unique relationship between the acquiring
company's resources and the characteristics of a particular product mar-
ket may be similarly indicative of the limited number of available entrants.
In FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 1 7 the acquirer was the nation's largest
advertiser and one of a limited number of firms engaged in the sale of
household cleaning products on a large scale; the Court upheld applica-
tion of the perceived potential entrant theory to a merger between the
acquirer and the largest producer of liqpid bleach, a product that was
itself heavily advertised and sold through the acquirer's existing market-
ing channels to its established class of customers."'
More generally, however, it may be difficult, if not impossible, to estab-
lish that the defendant was one of a limited number of potential entrants.
In those situations in which the exact number of perceived entrants is
subject to serious dispute, the plaintiff may be forced into the potentially
untenable position of arguing both that entry by the defendant is plausi-
ble and likely and, at the same time, that the target market is not so
desirable as to attract a significant number of other potential entrants.
Such a problem is particularly likely to develop in cases involving pure
conglomerate mergers, in which the sole basis for entry is the attractive-
ness of investment in a particular product or geographic area.'19 This
l" See, e.g., FTC v. Tenneco, Inc., 433 F. Supp. 105, 112-13 (D.D.C. 1977) (court recog-
nizes requirement that defendant be one of a limited number of firms); accord, United States v.
Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 430 F. Supp. at 772.
11' See 410 U.S. 526, 528 (1973). But see United States v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 383 F.
Supp. 1020 (D.R.I. 1974) (on remand, defendant held not to be perceived potential entrant).
11 386 U.S. 568 (1967).
118 See id. at 580.
19 The difficulties inherent in identification of an isolated perceived potential entrant,
even in a merger case involving arguably "related" product lines, are illustrated in FTC v.
Tenneco, Inc., 433 F. Supp. 105 (D.D.C. 1977) (preliminary injunction denied). Tenneco, a
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suggests that, whatever its conceptual shortcomings, the perceived poten-
tial entrant theory will have practical significance only in those few cases
in which special geographic or economic conditions point directly to
specific potential entrants. 120
C. Prospects for the Future of Potential Competition Doctrine
Both branches of the potential competition doctrine have clearly lost
their effectiveness in recent years. Despite the popularity of the actual
potential entrant theory with lower courts and commentators, its accep-
tance by the present Supreme Court seems doubtful, even assuming that
all necessary preconditions for its application could be met in practice.
The perceived potential entrant theory, although accepted and applied by
the Court, rests upon an economic theory that remains undemonstrated
and is perhaps undemonstrable in practice; thus, this branch of potential
competition doctrine will presumably also remain, for the immediate
future, a weapon of limited utility. As defense counsel gain experience
with both theories and as courts refine their economic analyses, the level
of preventive legal counseling will continue to rise, placing ever higher
evidentiary burdens upon the government in its enforcement attempts.
Moreover, the Marine Bancorporation decision itself has cast a substantial
shadow over antitrust litigation, with the less than surprising result that
defendants have prevailed in all conglomerate merger cases since 1974.12
Marine Bancorporation-and the perhaps illegitimate use made of its rea-
large conglomerate, was a leading manufacturer of automobile exhaust systems; its Walker
Division accounted for almost one third of national muffler sales. The Federal Trade Com-
mission challenged Tenneco's acquisition of Monroe, which sold 35-40% of all shock absorbers
in the United States. Although it was conceded that Tenneco's exhaust system line made it a
likely de novo or toehold entrant into Monroe's field, the court rejected the Commission's
request for a preliminary injunction. The court reasoned that, because there were numerous
other manufacturers of different automotive equipment who were equally likely potential
entrants, the loss of one perceived entrant such as Tenneco could have only minimal competi-
tive effect.
Tenneco can be contrasted with Phillips Petroleum, which involved a geographic extension
merger. The acquiring company, Phillips, one of the ten largest petroleum refiners in the
United States, had no gasoline stations on the West Coast. Phillips attempted to acquire
Tidewater, one of the larger gasoline sellers in California. Because Phillips was one of only a
few large petroleum companies not already operating on a nationwide basis, and because
there were marketing and advertising benefits from such a method of operation, the court
considered it highly probable both that Phillips would in fact enter by alternative means
should the proposed large-firm merger be prohibited and that market participants would
perceive Phillips as likely to attempt such entry. See United States v. Phillips Petroleum Co.,
367 F. Supp. at 1254.
120 Professor Turner has suggested that application of the perceived potential entrant
theory should be limited to those situations in which the acquiring company is either the most
likely entrant or one of two or three most likely entrants into a particular market. He argues
that the theory should not be applied in cases involving more than three perceived entrants,
because in such cases "the existence of a significant adverse competitive effect is too specula-
tive and remote to deserve treatment, in and of itself, as a decisive factor against a merger."
Turner, supra note 79, at 1365.
121 See note 9 supra.
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soning in such later lower court decisions as BOC '2 2-illustrates the fragil-
ity, in the face of judicial opposition, of any legal doctrine whose effec-
tiveness depends upon inherently speculative economic predictions. Suc-
cess in challenging conglomerate mergers will thus require increased
reliance upon alternative approaches, changed judicial attitudes and, ul-
timately, legislative reform.
III. PRESENT DIRECT INJURY TO COMPETITION
As has been discussed, potential competition doctrine focuses upon the
benefits to the target market of either perceived or actual potential for
entry by the acquiring firm in the absence of the proposed merger. As an
alternative approach, courts have also looked to the potential of the
proposed merger for direct anticompetitive injury to the acquired firm's
market. The recognized anticompetitive effects have taken two forms-
entrenchment and reciprocity. Entrenchment involves the negative com-
petitive impact of displacement within the target market of the acquired
firm by an acquiring firm of substantially greater economic power.
1 23
Reciprocity is the practice, by customers of the acquiring and acquired
firms, of doing business with one division of the merged entity in order to
obtain the business of another division of the same entity in return.
A. Entrenchment
The single most important factor to identification of entrenchment is
the size of the acquiring firm in relation to the target market. 124 FTC v.
Procter & Gamble Co. 125 provides the best illustration of possible market
domination by an acquiring firm. Procter & Gamble, a large national
manufacturer of low cost, high turnover household products and the
largest advertiser in the United States, had assets worth more than $500
million; Clorox, the largest manufacturer of liquid bleach, held almost
fifty percent of the national bleach market but had only twelve million
dollars in assets.' 26 In successfully challenging Procter & Gamble's at-
122 BOC Int'l Ltd. v. FTC, 557 F.2d 24 (2d Cir. 1977); see text accompanying notes 69-74
supra.
123 The possibilities for such effects have been an acknowledged element in antitrust
enforcement for more than 45 years. See United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 106, 115-19
(1932) (Court cites possible predatory practices in denying oligopolist-defendants' request for
modification of a consent decree under which defendants agreed to refrain from certain types
of conglomerate mergers).
124 On the basis that entrenchment effects are a rare phenomenon in practice, Professor
Turner has argued that they should be controlled only through an analysis of relative firm
size. He would prohibit mergers on an entrenchment basis only in those cases in which the
acquired firm's market was a "small-firm loose oligopoly" and the acquiring firm was "dispro-
portionately large," meaning that it had "roughly fifteen or more times the assets of the largest
firm selling in the market in which the acquisition is made." Turner, supra note 79, at 1360.
125 386 U.S. 568 (1967). See generally Elman, Clorox and Conglomerate Mergers, 6 ABA
Antitrust L.J. 23 (1967).
120 See id. at 570-73. Procter & Gamble's yearly advertising budget was more than twice
Clorox' annual sales. See id. at 571, 573. Note that Clorox and one other firm accounted for
almost 65% of national bleach sales; when combined with the relative assets of Clorox and
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tempted acquisition of Clorox, the FTC argued that the acquirer's massive
financial resources would permit it to dominate, both economically and
psychologically, the liquid bleach market. According to this "deep pocket"
theory, 127 cash reserves, easier or less expensive access to outside capital,
and income from other operations would give Procter & Gamble a grossly
disproportionate capacity to accept the reduced profits or short-term
losses necessary for initiation and survival of market price wars. At the
same time, the size of the new market entity would act to intimidate
present competitors from active competition and to discourage new mar-
ket entry for fear of retaliation. 128 The cumulative effect of such consid-
erations, according to the Court in Procter & Gamble, would be substan-
tially to raise market entry barriers and further to encourage long-term
market concentration.
1 29
Similar effects might also result from "synergistic" interaction between
the acquiring and acquired firms and their respective product lines.13 0 In
Procter & Gamble, this interaction was closely related to the economic
strength of the acquiring firm: Procter & Gamble, enormously influential
in the advertising and distribution of household products, moved into a
product line that depended upon the same method of distribution, the
same retailers and the same high level of advertising required for its
existing products; as a result, it could take advantage of volume advertis-
ing discounts and elaborate promotional schemes.13 ' Similarly, an acquir-
Procter & Gamble, this would be sufficient to bring the Procter & Gamble case within Professor
Turner's test for entrenchment. See note 124 supra.
127 See, e.g., Kennecott Copper Corp. v. FTC, 467 F.2d 67, 78 (10th Cir. 1972), cert. denied,
416 U.S. 909 (1974).
121 The mere fear of retaliation, even without any actual predatory acts by the acquiring
firm, will have limiting effects upon market competition. See generally Areeda & Turner,
Predatory Pricing and Related Practices Under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 88 Harv. L. Rev.
697, 705-09 (1975). Cf. Reynolds Metals Co. v. FTC, 309 F.2d 223, 229-30 (D.C. Cir. 1962)
(discussion of anticompetitive influence of Reynolds, the world's largest producer of
aluminum foil, with annual sales of more than $400 million, over the market of an aluminum
floral wrap company acquired by Reynolds; acquired company had $500,000 in sales and 30%
of the floral wrap market).
129 See FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. at 575-79; General Foods Corp. v. FTC, 386
F.2d 936 (3d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 919 (1968) (entry of major corporation into
highly concentrated steel wool pad market will substantially raise entry barriers). The increase
in entry barriers present in the Procter & Gamble and General Foods cases is itself a form of
adverse impact on potential competition, because it limits the ability of additional firms to
enter the target market and thus reduces the likelihood of eventual deconcentration. It may
also lead directly to higher market prices, as would occur if the entrenching firm was also
eliminated as a perceived potential entrant. See FTC v. Procter & Gamble, 386 U.S. at 593-97
(Harlan, J., concurring).
130 See United States v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 430 F. Supp. at 774 (entrenchment claim
rejected on merits) (test of entrenchment is by "degree of synergy between the acquired and
acquiring [firms]"); United States v. Crowell, Collier & Macmillan, Inc., 361 F. Supp. 983, 991
(S.D.N.Y. 1973) (entrenchment claim rejected on merits) (entrenchment requires "factual
bases and economic theory as applied to such facts indicating synergy [between the com-
panies]").
'31 See FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. at 575 (summary of FTC findings); accord,
General Foods Corp. v. FTC, 386 F.2d 936, 945 (3d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 919
(1968). Cf. United States v. Hughes Tool Co., 415 F. Supp. 637, 644-45 (C.D. Cal. 1976)
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ing firm may possess research, marketing, or management skills valuable
to development and promotion of a particular product. In other situa-
tions, considerations wholly divorced from financial strength-such as
reputation, customer loyalty and ownership of particular trademarks-
might provide the substituting firm with a decided competitive edge over
other market participants.
132
Despite the proliferation of possible criteria for identification of en-
trenchment, however, the lower courts have essentially failed in their
attempts to make principled extensions of the analysis developed in Proc-
ter & Gamble. As a result, entrenchment has remained at best a supporting
basis for prohibition of conglomerate mergers. In some cases involving
factors other than relative economic power, the examination of en-
trenchment effects appears to be based upon an analysis so indefinite as to
approach random speculation. 133 Even in Kennecott Copper Corp. v. FTC, 134
which involved the more traditional "deep pocket" approach, the court
failed to attempt any search for rival firms that, although smaller than the
acquirer, might have sufficient financial strength to resist intimidation by
a dominant firm.1 35 To some extent, these problems may reflect difficul-
ties inherent in applying to the common run of conglomerate merger
cases a theory developed in the almost unique factual setting of the Procter
(specialized, limited production nature of acquired company's tool business limits possible
impact on sales and distribution of large firm takeover).
132 See, e.g., United States v. Hughes Tool Co., 415 F. Supp. 637, 645 (C.D. Cal. 1976)
(acquired firm had its own established reputation, thus unlikely to benefit from takeover by
another larger and established firm).
Some of these factors may make effective competition with the entrenched firm more
difficult for reasons totally unrelated to price, quality, or efficiency. Others, however, may
involve legitimate economies of scale, or benefits of more effective management or marketing.
Such factors, in spite of their potential for predation or market dominance, are accepted as
desirable by-products of the superior competitive position of the acquiring firm. This appar-
ent inconsistency reflects the tension that exists under the Clayton Act, and under the antitrust
laws in general, between necessities of enforcement and a competitive ideal. See FTC v. Procter
& Gamble Co., 386 U.S. at 579-80 (majority opinion) (volume advertising discounts not
acceptable defense to claim of negative effect on competition under section 7); id. at 603-04
(Harlan, J., concurring) (proof of mere dollar savings not proof of actual economies). "Possi-
ble economies cannot be used as a defense to illegality. Congress was aware that some mergers
which lessen competition may also result in economies but it struck the balance in favor of
protecting competition." Id. at 580 (majority opinion) (citing Brown Shoe Co. v. United States,
370 U.S. 294 (1962)). To some extent, the disparity between possible economies in particular
cases and the criteria for control of mergers could also reflect the tension between the
competitive ideal and a concern with protection of smaller business entities. See section IV
iifra.
133 See, e.g., Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co. v. White Consol. Indus., Inc., 414 F.2d 506, 518 (3d
Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1009(1970) (two-paragraph entrenchment discussion; passing
reference to Procter & Gamble as "perhaps the leading case").
134 467 F.2d 67 (10th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 909 (1974); see note 28 supra.
135 See Comment, 86 Harv. L. Rev. 772, 783 (1973) (citing Turner, supra note 79, at 1360);
Kennecott Copper Corp. v. FTC, 467 F.2d 67, 77-79 (10th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 909
(1974). Cf. Missouri Portland Cement Co. v. Cargill, Inc., 498 F.2d 851, 865 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 883 (1974) (denial of preliminary injunction) (smaller competitors who have
already had to live among large market firms unlikely to "cower" at the prospect of market
entry by additional large firm).
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& Gamble case. 136 In addition, considerable disagreement exists among
economists and antitrust attorneys over whether the competitive behavior
hypothesized for acquiring firms and their competitors under entrench-
ment theory occurs under actual market conditions. 37 Nevertheless, in
view of the recent judicial hostility to the potential competition doctrine, a
return to reliance on entrenchment may suggest a useful method of
challenging some conglomerate mergers. An attempt to develop consis-
tent criteria for identifying entrenchment effects is critical to the success-
ful invocation of a method of merger challenge that depends upon proof
of potential for direct market injury.1
3 8
B. Reciprocity
In some conglomerate merger cases, the combined purchasing power of
the acquiring and acquired firms serves to encourage business dealings
between these companies and their suppliers. For example, if the ac-
quired company has been selling its goods in a market in which the
acquiring company makes substantial purchases, the acquiring company's
suppliers may consider it desirable, with or without explicit encourage-
ment from the merged firm, to direct their own purchasing needs to the
acquired company. 13 9 The potential for anticompetitive impact implicit in
such reciprocal dealings parallels that of market foreclosure in vertical
merger cases. 140 The predominant concern in those cases is that the
permanent linkage of previously independent customers and suppliers
136 Procter & Gamble makes clear that the likelihood of entrenchment effects increases if the
acquired company's product is a high turnover, low-priced, mass-marketed commodity, the
sale of which relies heavily on pre-selling by advertising. See also United States v. Wilson
Sporting Goods Co., 288 F. Supp. 543, 552 (N.D. 111. 1968).
37 See generally FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. at 588-89 (Harlan, J., concurring);
Hearings on Economic Concentration, Part 8, Before the Subcommittee on Antitrust And
Monopoly Legislation of the Senate Judiciary Committee, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970) (state-
ments of Willard Mueller, Richard Arnould, J. Fred Weston, Donald F. Turner, Richard
McLaren and Caspar Weinberger); Koller, The Myth of Predatory Pricing: An Empirical
Study, 4 Antitrust L. & Econ. Rev. 105 (1971). Compare Blair, supra note 15 (entrenchment
effects constitute significant problem), with Posner, Conglomerate Mergers and Antitrust
Policy: An Introduction, 44 St. John's L. Rev. 529 (spec. ed. 1970) (entrenchment effects
rarely present serious problem), and Turner, supra note 79, at 1379-86 (same).
13' Admittedly, many of the adverse effects described by the entrenchment doctrine would
also take place if the defendant were to enter de novo or by a toehold entry instead of by the
challenged large scale entry. Nonetheless, requiring those alternate forms of entry is still
preferable from the vantage point of increasing competition. First, if those alternatives were
followed, the target firm would still remain as a significant competitor. Second, the defendant
would contribute an additional firm to the market, with the short-term (and possibly long-
term) benefits of deconcentration. Finally, even if the still-independent target company would
have difficulty competing against the giant eventually, requiring an alternate form of entry
alters the time frame. During the few years that a large acquirer needs to build up market
shares, existing and potential competitors can make adjustments, even including defensive
acquisitions.
1 This description of reciprocity places the acquired firm "upstream" and the acquiring
firm "downstream" in the manufacturing and distribution chain. Of course, similar effects
would occur if the relative positions were reversed.
"0 See United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 258 F. Supp. 36, 56-58 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
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will limit the market opportunities available to other competitors.' To
the extent that reciprocity results in allocation of market resources
through the leverage of control over other business rather than through
free competition, it has a similarly destructive effect upon the market.
Express reciprocity agreements have been prohibited since the 1930s as
"unfair methods of competition" under section 5 of the Federal Trade
Commission Act. 42 Only in 1965, however, did the Supreme Court estab-
lish that the potential for reciprocal dealings implicit in certain market
structures could constitute a sufficient basis for proscription of a merger
under the Clayton Act. In FTC v. Consolidated Foods Corp., 143 the Federal
Trade Commission challenged the acquisition of Gentry, a manufacturer
of dehydrated onions and garlic, by Consolidated, a wholesaler making
substantial purchases of foods containing these products. The Commis-
sion argued that, after consummation of the Consolidated-Gentry merger,
Consolidated would be in a position to influence its suppliers to purchase
and use Gentry's products rather than those of Gentry's competitors. In
approving the Commission's order setting aside the merger, the Supreme
Court held that it was unnecessary for the Commission to make an
affirmative showing that Gentry had in fact required suppliers to deal
with Gentry. Rather, the Court considered it sufficient that Gentry ac-
counted for a substantial share of a concentrated market in which Con-
solidated was a major purchaser, thus raising a significant possibility that
Consolidated's suppliers might feel obligated to direct their business to-
ward Gentry.1
4 4
The size and purchasing power of the acquired and acquiring firms
145
and the oligopolistic characteristics of the acquired company's market
146
'4' See, e.g., Ford Motor Co. v. United States, 405 U.S. 562 (1972) (vertical merger).
142 See California Packing Corp., 25 F.T.C. 379 (1937); Mechanical Mfg. Co., 16 F.T.C. 67
(1932); Waugh Equipment Co., 15 F.T.C. 232 (1931).
143 380 U.S. 592 (1965).
144 Id. at 597, 600; see Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co. v. White Consol. Indus., Inc., 414 F.2d 506
(3d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1009 (1970); United States v. White Consol. Indus., Inc.,
323 F. Supp. 1397 (N.D. Ohio 1971); United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 258 F. Supp.
36 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
"I The Court did not establish relevant size and market share factors in the Consolidated
Foods case. Prior to merger, Gentry had about 32% of the total sales of dehydrated garlic and
onion; several years after the merger, this had risen to about 35%. See 380 U.S. at 595. In
United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 258 F. Supp. 36, 63-65 (S.D.N.Y. 1966), a figure of
35-40% of total market sales by the acquired firm was considered sufficient to create a
potential for reciprocity. In Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co. v. White Consol. Indus., Inc., 414 F.2d
506, 518-19 (3d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1009 (1970), the court considered the
potential for reciprocity to have been established because the acquiring company, White,
through its Blaw-Knox Division, accounted for about 20% of market sales in an industry in
which the acquired firm made substantial purchases.
146 See, e.g., United States v. Pennick & Ford, Ltd., 242 F. Supp. 518 (D.N.J. 1965) (request
for preliminary injunction denied) (absence of tight oligopoly). The marketing procedures of
the acquired and acquiring firms may also be relevant. Compare United States v. White Consol.
Indus., Inc., 323 F. Supp. 1397, 1398-99 (N.D. Ohio 1971) (merger may have reciprocity
consequences even if acquiring firm does not encourage reciprocal practices), with United
States v. Northwest Indus., Inc., 301 F. Supp. 1066, 1091 (N.D. Il. 1969) (claim of corporate
officers that purchasers not likely to continue reciprocal practices after realization of the
acquired firm's policy against such practices).
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form the basis for establishing a potential for reciprocal dealings and thus
for prohibition of a merger under section 7. The fact that the merging
firms do not, after merger, take advantage of this potential will not
necessarily validate the merger. The Supreme Court in Consolidated Foods
placed little reliance upon evidence offered by the defendant to show that
Gentry's market share had either remained stable or decreased slightly
after merger. As the Court asserted, such evidence could merely indicate
that the acquired firm's product was inferior to others available in the
market and that reciprocal dealings were serving artificially to sustain
Gentry's .market share in the face of contrary competitive pressures.
1
17
It has been suggested that "reciprocity is as inevitable a result of wide-
spread conglomerate structure as price rigidity is a consequence of
oligopoly structure" and that the proper remedy for both problems is
direct control of conglomeration itself through application of potential
competition theory. 48 As demonstrated in an earlier section of this arti-
cle, however, there are serious limitations upon any attempt to apply
potential competition theory. Moreover, principal reliance upon potential
competition instead of reciprocity ignores the specific advantage of the
Supreme Court's approach to reciprocity. Because the potential for reci-
procity is based upon proof of a suspect market structure, it offers a simple
and mechanical method for isolation of anticompetitive mergers. This
avoids the problems of detection and proof of anticompetitive effect that
are present under both potential competition theory-which attempts to
head off the trend toward concentration-and post-merger standards set
forth in provisions of the Federal Trade Commission and Sherman Acts,
intended to limit certain forms of large-firm conduct. The shortcomings
of these other two approaches are likely to be particularly acute with
respect to those mergers having a large potential for reciprocal dealings
for two reasons: the likelihood of such practices will probably increase as
merging firms become larger and more diversified; and the practices are
as likely to result from unilateral actions on the part of suppliers and
purchasers as from any conspiratorial activity between these suppliers and
purchasers and the merging firms, making detection and successful pros-
147 See FTC v. Consolidated Foods Corp., 380 U.S. at 598-600. There was some evidence
presented in Consolidated Foods that Gentry's products had historically been considered in-
ferior to those of its competitors. Id. at 599-600.
14 Blake, Conglomerate Mergers and the Antitrust Laws, 73 Colum. L. Rev. 555, 569
(1973). Enforcement agencies have been unwilling to rely upon either reciprocity or en-
trenchment in conglomerate merger challenges. Owen Johnson, former director of the
Federal Trade Commission's Bureau of Competition, recently stated that these doctrines were
inappropriate for attacking conglomerate mergers and should be replaced by a program of
primary, if not total, reliance upon the actual potential entrant doctrine. Mr. Johnson argued
that, if either reciprocity or entrenchment were undesirable as business practices, they could
more effectively be controlled by direct action under the Sherman or Federal Trade Commis-
sion Acts after merger; the mere possibility that such practices might occur was in itself an
insufficient basis for disallowance of a merger. See Clayton Act Amendment: Hearing on H.R.
6001 Before the Subcommittee on Monopolies and Commercial Law of the House Comm. on
the Judiciary, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 5-6 (1977) (statement of Owen M. Johnson, Jr.).
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ecution under the Sherman Act difficult and unlikely. Renewed reliance
by the antitrust enforcement agencies on reciprocity is commended in
appropriate cases.
IV. REFORMING SECTION 7 OF THE CLAYTON ACT
A., The Background for Change
The antitrust laws distinguish between those forms of economic activity
that are inherently anticompetitive and those that, although subject to
abuse, are capable of societal benefit if properly regulated. 49 Thus, price
fixing among market competitors is illegal per se; 150 on the other hand,
mergers are proscribed only to the extent that they tend "substantially to
lessen competition."'151 Although mergers have substantial potential anti-
competitive effects, they may also allow the attainment of many desirable
objectives. Mergers provide one-and, in some cases, the only-effective
method for transfer of an ongoing corporate entity; accordingly, they
serve to preserve the liquidity of corporate assets and to encourage in-
vestment. 152 Corporate acquisitions in the form of merger may also per-
mit the infusion of new capital and fresh management into ailing busi-
ness153 and, even in situations involving successful operations, may pro-
mote important economic efficiencies. A horizontal merger may allow two
companies to operate from a single plant or distributional network with
resulting economies of scale and with reduced costs of production and
marketing; furthermore, it may enable smaller companies, through com-
bination, to compete more effectively against larger rivals.' 54 Vertical
mergers may produce similar savings in costs of production and distribu-
tion and may have additional competitive advantages in the form of
14 [Tlhere are certain agreements or practices which because of their pernicious
effect on competition and lack of any redeeming virtue are conclusively presumed to be
unreasonable and therefore illegal without elaborate inquiry as to the precise harm they
have caused or the business excuse for their use.
Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958), quoted in Continental T.V., Inc. v.
GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 50 (1977).
151 See, e.g., United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940) (price-fixing
agreement unlawful per se tinder the Sherman Act); accord, United States v. Trenton Potteries
Co., 273 U.S. 392 (1927).
'5' 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1970).
[A]t the same time that it sought to create an effective tool for preventing all mergers
having demonstrable anticompetitive effects, Congress recognized the stimulation to
competition that might flow from particular mergers-.... Taken as a whole, the legislative
history [of the Celler-Kefauver Act] illuminates congressional .. .desire to restrain
mergers only to the extent that such combinations may tend to lessen competition.
Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 319-20 (1962).
i52 See Turner, supra note 79, at 1317. An absolute prohibition on sales of ongoing corpo-
rate enterprises would act as a serious disincentive to investment; many people invest in a
business based on the expectation of selling the enterprise at a later date as a profit-making
organization.
3 See FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568, 588 (1967) (Harlan,J., concurring); see
Bryan, Conglomerate Mergers: Proposed Guidelines, 11 Harv. J. Legis. 31, 38-40 (1973). See
generally Turner, supra note 79, at 1317-18.
i54 See Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 319 (1962).
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greater market control, because the upstream company gains an assured
outlet taking at a predictable rate and the downstream company an
assured source of supply.
Precisely because existing antitrust legislation is reasonably effective in
controlling abuse, some vertical and horizontal mergers can be permitted,
thus allowing their societal benefits to be realized at minimal competitive
risk. 5 ' As previously discussed, however, this existing legislation-
fashioned principally with an eye toward the problems of horizontal and
vertical acquisitions-is inadequate to the task of controlling large-firm
conglomerate mergers. These mergers offer more limited benefits to
society and possess their own special potential for economic abuse. Conse-
quently, the successful regulation of such mergers will require, at a mini-
mum, a more specifically tailored statutory framework and perhaps an
entirely different theoretical approach as well.
The companies involved in conglomerate mergers operate in different
markets-product or geographic-prior to merger. Therefore, many of
the opportunities for effecting economies after merger that were present
in horizontal and vertical merger cases are no longer available. In pure
conglomerate merger cases, little may be gained beyond a reduction in
high level personnel15 6 and, possibly, greater access to sources of outside
capital; 5 7 the net result may actually be a less efficient operating entity.158
In return, the target market loses the competitive benefits of a potential
new market entrant-perceived or actual-and gains increased risks of
entrenchment and reciprocity.
At least as significant as these economic considerations, however, are
the pervasive social and political effects of the corporate concentration
that is fostered by widespread conglomeration. As large firms have grown
larger and as the percentage of national sales and production held by
these firms has increased, the result has been more than a gain in eco-
nomic power. Economic power has in turn given these companies com-
mensurate potential for influence over social and political aspects of
society, and corporate management has in recent years actively im-
plemented this potential both openly through legitimate lobbying and
'"5 At least some mergers will have procompetitive effects. For example, if a company
makes a toehold acquisition, it will have to compete vigorously to attain a significant market
share and will force existing companies to adjust their prices and improve their goods or
services. The larger, acquiring firm will inject new capacity and new competitive forces into
the industry which the smaller company could not offer. The merger will, in short, "shake up
the industry," at least for a few years. Robinson, supra note 88, at 184 (quoting Turner, supra
note 79, at 1384).
156 See United States v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 410 U.S. at 541-42 (Douglas, J., concurring)
(example of reduction in personnel).
10 Possible additional benefits, which large firm conglomerate mergers share with other
types of corporate acquisitions, might include better risk allocation, protection from price
fluctuation through diversification, and possible tax advantages. See Bryan, supra note 152, at
40-41; cf. note 132 supra (possible advertising economies not recognized as sufficient basis for
approval of merger).
158 See Blair, supra note 15, at 679-83 (conglomerate companies may suffer from certain
economic inefficiencies not characteristic of smaller, undiversified firms).
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advertising efforts'5 9 and clandestinely through bribes and kickback
schemes.' 60 These same companies control thousands of jobs, with corre-
sponding influence over the lives of their employees.16 1 In short, concen-
tration of wealth has led to concentration of social and political
influence.1
6 2
Under ideal conditions, the relative allocation of political and social
power would perhaps not be made through the antitrust laws.1 63 In
practice, however, the conclusion that these laws embody political and
social aspirations as well as economic goals cannot be escaped and should
not be avoided. The Sherman Act, a product of the Populist Era, was as
much a reaction to fear about the loss of personal opportunities and the
growth of urbanization as it was a response to the specific economic ills
that flowed from the Oil, Tobacco and Sugar Trusts. 64 The legislative
history of the antimerger provisions of the 1914 Clayton and 1950
Celler-Kefauver Acts similarly reflects concern with both the economic
and political ramifications of corporate acquisitions . 6  The decisions of
the Supreme Court have themselves consistently indicated an awareness
"I Mobil Oil Corporation, for example, decided in 1973 to reduce substantially advertising
of consumer products in favor of a program of "advocacy advertising." The corporation now
spends in excess of $20 million per year promoting its views on national energy policy,
environmental questions and general economic issues. See Ross, Public Relations Isn't Kid-
Glove Stuff at Mobil, Fortune, Sept. 1976, at 106-10; Schmertz, Mobil's Motives, Wall St. J.,
Apr. 10, 1978, at 22, col. 3.
160 See, e.g., Wall St. J., Sept. 28, 1977, at 48, col. 2 (SEC charges Exxon with $56.5 million of
overseas payoffs); N.Y. Times, May 27, 1977, § 3, at 1, col. 4 (estimate by Lockheed Corpora-
tion of at least $38 million paid by its employees in bribes and other questionable payments);
id., Jan. 14, 1976, at 1, col. 2 (resignation of chief executive officer of Gulf Oil after disclosure
of illegal payments).
161 See R. Nader & M. Green, The Nader Report: Corporate Power in America 11 (1973)
("[e]very large corporation should be thought of as a political system, that is, [as] an entity
whose leaders exercise power, influence and control over other human beings") (quoting
Professor Robert A. Dahl). See also United States v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 410 U.S. at 543
(Douglas, J., concurring) (discussion of negative social influence of large-firm merger); Wall
St. J., June 6, 1977, at 2, col. 2 (plans for layoffs and plant closings in steel industry due to
competition from imported steel); N.Y. Times, Nov. 10, 1974, at 69, col. 1 (4000 plants
employing 200,000 people closed in Michigan from 1967 to 1973 with severest impact in cities
with large automobile plants).
162 See generally R. Nader & M. Green, supra note 161. "The political power of corporations
does not depend upon bribes and illegal pressure tactics. It results from the use of legal tools
only available to concentrations of financial power." Id. at 25 (quoting former Senator Fred R.
Harris).
163 See, e.g., Blake & Jones, In Defense of Antitrust, 65 Colum. L. Rev. 377, 381-84 (1965)
(minimal political interference and maximum individual economic liberty should be dual goals
of effective antitrust policy); Bork, Contrasts in Antitrust Theory: I, 65 Colum. L. Rev. 401,
410-15 (1965).
164 See generally W. Letwin, Law and Economic Policy in America (1965); H. Thorelli, The
Federal Antitrust Policy (1955); Blake, supra note 148, at 574-79; Blake & Jones, supra note
163, at 381-84.
[I]t seems probable that [the drafters of the Sherman Act] also desired to protect equal
opportunity and equal access for small business for noneconomic reasons: concentration
o resources in the hands of a few was viewed as a social and political catastrophe as well.
C. Kaysen & D. Turner, supra note 27, at 19.
"65 See Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 311-23 (1962).
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that the antitrust laws serve political as well as economic purposes,1 66
advancing goals that may at times even require higher prices and less
economic efficiency.
An antitrust economic policy favoring smaller businesses in preference
to multi-billion dollar conglomerates is, furthermore, not inconsistent with
economic efficiency goals. Some have argued that consideration of these
political objectives is improper, because preservation of the assumedly
inefficient small companies must be at the expense of the consumer, who
will pay higher prices reflecting the higher costs of small businesses
operating at less than full economies of scale. 16 7 -lowever, it is equally
plausible that encouraging additional centers of economic decisionmaking
will both spur innovation and make more difficult express or tacit collu-
sion, with a resultant lowering of prices and increase in volume of
production-the very goal of scholars taking a purely economic approach
to antitrust.
Despite both the acknowledged existence of these broader considerations
and the continued pronouncements about the evils of increased concentra-
tion, antitrust regulation has remained solidly grounded upon economic
principles-with erratic results. 6 In the late 1960s, the Department of
Justice brought a series of challenges to pure conglomerate mergers based
solely upon firm size. Although some resulted in divestiture under consent
decrees,'69 none of the challenges was successful in producing the desired
judicial determination that a pure conglomerate merger, without proof of
anticompetitive effect, could be held unlawful.17 0 The problem of industrial
"' See United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 610-12 (1972) (scheme tbr
horizontal allocation of territories to minimize competition found to violate Sherman Act;
Justice Marshall questions political propriety of decision about competition being made by
group unresponsive to public); Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 7 (1958)
(tying arrangement found to violate Sherman Act); Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337
U.S. 293, 309 (1949) (exclusive dealings contract); United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co.,
310 U.S. 150, 221 (1940) (price-fixing). See also United States v. Aluminum Co., 148 F.2d 416,
429 (2d Cir. 1945) ("[t]hroughout the history of these [antitrust] statutes, it has been constantly
assumed that one of their purposes was to perpetuate and preserve, for its own sake and in
spite of possible cost, an organization of industry in small units which can effectively compete
with each other") (cited with approval in United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270, 275
n.7 (1966)).
167 See, e.g., R. Posner, supra note 111, at 20.
168 See Brodley, Potential Competition Mergers: A Structural Synthesis, 87 Yale L.J. 1,
33-34 (1977) (principal shortcoming of potential competition doctrine is its failure to take
account of noneconomic goals of antitrust).
"9s See United States v. International Tel. & Tel. Corp., [1971] Trade Cas. 1 73,667 (N.D.
11. 1971) (consent judgment ordering divestiture of Canteen Corp.); United States v. Interna-
tional Tel. & Tel. Corp., [1971] Trade Cas. 73,666 (D. Conn. 1971) (consent judgment
ordering divestiture of Hartford Fire Ins. Co.); United States v. International Tel. & Tel.
Corp., [ 1971] Trade Cas. 73,665 (D. Conn. 1971) (consent judgment ordering divestiture of
Grinnell Corp.); United States v. Ling-Temco-Vought, Inc., [ 1970] Trade Cas. 73,105 (W.D.
Pa. 1970) (consent judgment ordering divestiture of Braniff Airlines). See also United States v.
Northwest Indus., Inc., 301 F. Supp. 1066 (N.D. II. 1969) (hold separate order issued).
70 A merger which has the effect of increasing economic concentration, even substantially,
however, does not necessarily lessen competition substantially; and evidence that a
merger may increase economic concentration, without more, is not sufficient to halt a
merger under Section 7 without a specific showing that it may have anti-competitive
effects.
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concentration has grown steadily more acute since passage of the Celler-
Kefauver Act. In twenty-five years, the level of concentration has increased
twenty-five percent: in 1948, the share of the nation's manufacturing assets
accounted for by the 200 largest corporations was 48.2%; by 1958, this
share had climbed to 56.5%; and in 1973, the last year for which data are
available, the share was 60.3%. 1'7 Clearly, this trend cannot be attributed
solely to an increase in large firm mergers, 172 but it does reflect a failure of
the present antitrust laws to achieve their intended goals and thus suggests
the need for a new approach .
73
B. Specific Proposals
In dealing with conglomerate mergers, enforcement agencies should
obviously give continued consideration to refinement of the weapons avail-
able under the existing statutory structure. This might include increased
reliance upon entrenchment and reciprocity, concentration upon the more
winnable geographic extension merger cases, 174 and emphasis upon chal-
lenging conglomerate mergers involving very large corporate entities, re-
gardless of the relationship between the particular firms involved.' 7  Re-
newed attempts could also be made to induce judicial creation of presump-
tions or other devices favorable to merger control. 76 One basis for encour-
United States v. International Tel. & Tel. Co., 306 F. Supp. 766, 796 (D. Conn. 1969) (citation
omitted).
171 Penn, Aggregate Concentration: A Statistical Note, 21 Antitrust Bull. 91, 92-93 (1976).
Professor Scherer has estimated that the percentage of total manufacturing assets controlled
by the 100 largest American -firms climbed from 36.5% in 1924 to 50% in 1967. F. Scherer,
Industrial Market Structure and Economic Performance 43, fig. 3.1 (1970).
172 See Address by Professor F. Scherer, ABA Section on Antitrust Law Annual Meeting
(Aug. 10, 1977) (unpublished text at 10) (comparative study of major firms in the United
States and West Germany revealed some correlation between tough anti-merger enforcement
and reduced rate of corporate concentration). Cf. Report of the President's Task Force on
Antitrust Policy, 115 Cong. Rec. 13,890, 13,894 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Report] (mergers
have contributed "somewhat" to concentration trend, but not !'solely responsible" and possibly
only minor factor). See also Blake, supra note 148, at 556 n.10.
173 See generally Blake, supra note 148 (antimerger enforcement seriously hampered by
undue emphasis upon economic analysis; economic approach in part fostered by the language
of section 7 of the Clayton Act). Cf. Posner, Antitrust Policy and the Supreme Court: An
Analysis of the Restricted Distribution, Horizontal Merger and Potential Competition Deci-
sions, 75 Colum. L. Rev. 282, 323 (1975) (enforcement problems in part result of failure of
courts to develop coherent theoretical basis for antitrust law).
174 In product extension mergers challenged under the perceived potential entrant doc-
trine, it is less likely that the defendant will meet the requirement that it be one of only a few
significant firms on the fringes. It is more probable that the defendant in a geographic
extension merger case will have these unique characteristics, since the relevant market may
well have been defined as an industry with a limited number of competitors, and the inquiry
will only be which of those firms will most likely expand into an adjacent territory.
175 See text accompanying notes 169-70 supra.
176 The Supreme Court has already recognized the propriety of relying on presumptions
when dealing with horizontal mergers. Once the combined market share of the merging firms
exceeds a certain level, the burden of proof shifts to the defendants to show the absence of a
reasonable probability of injury to competition.
This intense congressional concern with the trend toward concentration warrants
dispensing, in certain areas, with elaborate proof of market structure, market behavior, or
probable anticompetitive effects. Specifically, we think that a merger which produces a
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agement in this area is the likely expansion of the federal judiciary in the
next few years, 177 hopefully staffed with judges who are more favorably
disposed toward vigorous antitrust enforcement. However, any hopes for a
judicial turn-around in the lower courts must be tempered by an awareness
of the continued hostility of the current Supreme Court toward activist
application of the antitrust laws.
Moreover, the recent trend toward weaker enforcement of section 7
reflects not only the changed composition of the Supreme Court, but also a
gradual dilution of prosecutorial effectiveness over the years. In 1948, the
Supreme Court affirmed, by a 5-4 vote, -a lower court determination that
the acquisition of one of the largest steel fabricators on the West Coast by a
subsidiary of U.S. Steel Company-the nation's largest steel producer-did
not violate the Sherman Act.178 Adverse reaction to that decision provided
the final impetus for congressional revision of section 7 of the Clayton
Act.179 The resulting legislation-the Celler-Kefauver Act of 1950"'5 -and
firm controlling an undue percentage share of the relevant market, and results in a
significant increase in the concentration of firms in that market is so inherently likely to
lessen competition substantially that it must be enjoined in the absence of evidence clearly
showing that the merger is not likely to have such anticompetitive effects.
United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 363 (1963).
Relying upon this case, Professor Blake has argued for a judicially created presumption of
illegality for conglomerate mergers over a certain size. Blake, supra note 148, at 591. See also
Thomas, Conglomerate Merger Syndrome-A Comparison: Congressional Policy with En-
forcement Policy, 36 Fordham L. Rev. 461 (1968); Note, Conglomerates and Section 7: Is Size
Enough?, 70 Colum. L. Rev. 337, 355-58 (1970).
The Justice Department might draft and attempt to persuade the courts to apply specific
conglomerate merger guidelines similar to the general guidelines promulgated by the De-
partment in 1968. See Department of Justice, Proposed Merger Guidelines (1968), reprinted in
1 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 4510 (1975). For a discussion of other possible litigation strategies
under existing laws, see note 96 supra.
"' Both the Senate and House have recently passed bills that would create additional
district and circuit courtjudgeships. See S. 11,95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977) (passed by voice vote
May 24, 1977); H.R. 7843, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977) (passed by voice vote Feb. 7, 1978). The
two bills are now being considered in joint conference. See [1977-78-1] Cong. Index (CCH)
21,001.
178 United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495 (1948). The transaction involved the
acquisition of the assets of the acquired company and thus was challenged under section 1 of
the Sherman Act, because the Clayton Act at that time applied only to the acquisition of the
securities of another company.
In his dissent to Columbia Steel, Justice Douglas made a forceful statement of the social
dangers inherent in the concentration of corporate resources:
We have here the problem of bigness .... [S]ize can become a menace-both industrial
and social.... The philosophy of the Sherman Act is that [centralized economic power]
should not exist. For all power tends to develop into a government in itself. Power that
controls the economy should be in the hands of elected representatives of the people, not
in the hands of an industrial oligarchy. Industrial power should be decentralized. It
should be scattered into many hands so that the fortunes of the people will not be
dependent on the whim or caprice, the political preiudices, the emotional stability of a few
self-appointed men. The fact that they are not vicious men but respectable and social-
minded is irrelevant. That is.the philosophy of the Sherman Act. It is founded on a theory
of hostility to the concentration in private hands of power so great that only a government
of the people should have it.
Id. at 535-36 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
179 See Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 315-23 (1962).
The dominant theme pervading congressional consideration of the 1950 amendments
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the congressional concern for strict antimerger enforcement that it em-
bodied formed, for over two decades, the basis of pro-government deci-
sions in the Supreme Court. After nearly thirty years, however, the
strength of even a strong congressional mandate must eventually weaken,
and courts may legitimately question continued attempts to rely upon this
mandate as a basis for innovative change without evidence of renewed
congressional concern.
Given both the posture of the Supreme Court and the passage of time, a
new and clear statement of congressional concern with the dangers of
corporate concentration would provide the basis for a move toward inno-
vation in the lower courts and, ultimately, for changes at the Supreme
Court level. As did the Celler-Kefauver Act in the 1950s and 1960s, such
a statement could establish a climate appropriate to renewed judicial
activism in merger law. At the same time, however, the problems of
conglomerate mergers should be addressed by specific modifications of
the language of section 7 of the Clayton Act. 18' An amended statute
should clearly delineate-as the current statute does not-the standard of
proof required to establish injury to competition under section 7; the
inherently speculative nature of all potential competition doctrine re-
quires that the government be held to a lesser standard than the substan-
tial probability and specificity of injury standards implicitly imposed by
the courts in recent cases. 182 The statute should answer the question
reserved in Falstaff and Marine Bancorporation 8 3 by expressly providing
that "lessening competition" under section 7 includes the loss of future
improvement to competition relevant under the actual potential entrant
doctrine as well as the loss of present competition relevant under conven-
was a tear of what was considered to be a rising tide of economic concentration in the
American economy.
Congress saw the process of concentration in American business as a dynamic force; it
sought to assure the Federal Trade Commission and the courts the power to brake this
force at its outset and betore it gathered momentum.
Id. at 315-18 (footnote omitted).
0 Act of Dec. 29, 1950, ch. 1184, 64 Stat. 1125 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1970)).
181 Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977), illustrates the dangers inherent in
reliance upon clear evidence of legislative intent, without detailed statutory specifications,
when faced with the current judicial climate. At issue was the right of indirect purchasers to
sue for damages under section 4 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970), as amended,
Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-435, 90 Stat. 1383.
The majority in Illinois Brick did not consider the available legislative history dispositive, 431
U.S. at 733 n.14; Justice Brennan in dissent stated that he found it "difficult to see how
Congress could have expressed itself more clearly." Id. at 758.
182 Section 7 of the Clayton Act outlaws mergers in which the effect "may be substantially to
lessen competition" (emphasis added). This has been interpreted to mean that the merger
must have a "reasonable probability" of injury. Alternate standards-either of mere possibility
or of certainty-were rejected. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 323 n.39
(1962).
By contrast, the Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 13 (1970), requires merely a showing of
a "reasonable possibility" that the discriminatory prices will adversely affect competition. FTC
v. Morton Salt Co., 334 U.S. 37, 47 (! 948). It might be appropriate to use the same language
for an amended section 7.
183 See note 92 supra.
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tional theory. A more radical step would involve expansion of the per-
ceived potential entrant doctrine through removal of the preconditions
18 4
that the perceived entrant be one of only a limited number of firms
situated at the edge of the target market and that actual proof of market
response be established. Removal of these conditions would effectively
require entry by alternative means into all markets in which perception of
possible entrants is, on the basis of the objective evidence available to
market participants, a significant competitive factor. 185
A reasonable point of departure for development of a broader merger
statute b sed upon this second approach would be the study conducted in
the late 1960s by President Johnson's Task Force on Antitrust Policy. This
group published a final report (the "Neal Report"),' 86 which contained a
draft merger act that would have outlawed any merger between a "large
firm"-a company with sales in excess of $500 million or assets in excess
of $250 million-and a "leading firm"-a company with more than a ten
percent market share in an industry characterized by $100 million in sales
and a four-firm concentration ratio of fifty percent or more. 8 7 Such a
statute would have had the effect of proscribing many mergers that have
recently been approved under section 7. For example, all four conglom-
erate mergers unsuccessfully challenged in the courts in 1977 would have
been found unlawful under the task force's proposed statute. 88 The
See text accompanying notes 112-20 supra.
'8 Such an approach involves tacit acknowledgment that the perceived potential entrant
theory does not depend upon whether limit pricing actually occurs in practice.
18' Report, supra note 172. This report is often identified by reference to the chairman of
the task force, Professor (later Dean) Phil C. Neal of the University of Chicago Law School.
"I Id. at 13,899. Section 2(d) of the Report's proposed merger act provides that "[t]he term
'market' shall mean a relevant economic market, appropriately defined with reference to
geographic area.., and product or service .. " Although the standards and definition might
appear to lend themselves to mechanical application, problems of market definition are
among the most difficult aspects of merger analysis and are likely to present problems here.
Consider, for example, the dispute among FTC commissioners over the proper market
definition in The Budd Co., see 86 F.T.C. 518, 568 n.2 (Dixon, C., dissenting), discussed
earlier in this article. See note 64 supra.
Some years before the Neal Report was developed, Professors Kaysen and Turner advanced
a proposal that large firms making acquisitions above a certain size be required to spin off
assets of equal size. See C. Kaysen & D. Turner, supra note 27, ch. 4; Davidow, supra note 79, at
1282-83.
"8I In FTC v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 549 F.2d 289 (4th Cir. 1977), Arco--the nation's
thirteenth largest publicly held corporation, engaged primarily in the production and sale of
petroleum and petroleum products-acquired The Anaconda Company, the nation's third
largest producer of copper ore and concentrates. Under the Neal Report's draft merger act,
both Arco and Anaconda would be defined as "large firms." In 1975, Arco had assets of
$7.364 billion, while Anaconda's assets were $2.007 billion. FTC Complaint at 2. Anaconda
was also a "leading firm"; the FTC alleged that Anaconda had an 11.1% market share in
copper mine production in an industry in which the top four firms accounted for 59%. Id. at 4.
Total 1972 sales were $1.588 billion. U.S. Bureau of the Census, Census of Mineral Industries,
Subject, Industry and Area Statistics, at 10B-5 (1976). The circuit court put Anaconda's
market share at 8.27%. 549 F.2d at 291. Similarly, the Commission alleged that Anaconda's
market share of refined copper was 10.1% in a market in which the four largest firms had 72%
of the market. FTC Complaint at 4. Total 1972 industry sales were $2.77 billion. U.S. Bureau
of the Census, Census of Manufactures, Industry Series: Smelting and Refining of Nonfer-
rous Metals and Alloys, at 33C-14 (1975). The circuit court put Anaconda's share here at
1978]
BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 58:199
statute would similarly have permitted enforcement agencies to prevent
some mergers that, under present statutory standards, the agencies have
not even attempted to challenge. s 9
9.78%. 549 F.2d at 291. In any event, although Arco's withdrawal from the uranium market
allowed the Fourth Circuit to discount any horizontal merger concerns in that market, under
the Neal Report's proposed act, it would have been dispositive that Anaconda accounted for
17.8% of the uranium oxide market, in which four firm concentration was 60%. FTC
Complaint at 5. Total industry sales in 1972 were $133 million. Rand McNally Co., Corporate
Profiles for Executives and Investors (1976).
In BOC Int'l Ltd. v. FTC, 557 F.2d 24 (2d Cir. 1977), BOC, the acquiring company, had
total sales of $766 million; Airco had sales of $583 million. Brief for FTC at 10. See text
accompanying notes 68-72 supra. Airco was also a "leading firm," with a 16% share of the
industrial gases market, in which the three largest firms had 60% of the market. Id. Total 1972
industry sales were $679 million. U.S. Bureau of the Census, Census of Manufactures, 1972
Industry Series: Industrial Inorganic Chemicals, at 28A- 11 (1975).
In FTC v. Tenneco, Inc., 433 F. Supp. 105 (D.D.C. 1977), request for stay denied, [1977-1]
Trade Cas. 61,470 (D.C. Cir. 1977), Tenneco, the acquiring company, was a "large firm,"
with assets in 1975 of $6.5 billion. FTC Complaint at 5. Monroe was a "leading firm," with 32%
of domestic replacement shock absorber sales in an industry in which the four largest
companies accounted for at least 83% of the market. Id. at 6, 8. Total industry sales in 1972
were $105 million. U.S. Bureau of the Census, Census of Manufactures, Industry Series:
Motor Vehicle and Equipment, at 37A-19 (1974).
In Babcock & Wilcox Co. v. United Technologies, 435 F. Supp. 1249 (N.D. Ohio 1977),
Babcock & Wilcox, which is engaged primarily in the manufacture of steam generating
equipment, sought to enjoin a tender offer to its shareholders by United Technologies (UT), a
conglomerate engaged in the manufacture of aircraft and rocket engines and turbines. Both
companies would be defined as "large firms" and "leading firms." United Technologies had
total 1976 sales of $5.166 billion. In 1973, it accounted for 40% of the sales in the aircraft
engine industry, which had total sales of $3.64 billion and a four firm concentration ratio of
77%. U.S. Bureau of the Census, Census of Manufactures, Vol. I, Subject and Special
Statistics, at SR2-41 (1976); United Aircraft [predecessor of UT] Annual Report 1973, at 12
(1974). Babcock & Wilcox had total 1976 sales of $1.691 billion. It accounted for 42% of sales
of steam generating equipment; 1972 total industry'sales were $2.189 billion, and the four
largest firms accounted for over 90% of that market. Babcock & Wilcox Annual Report
(1974); U.S. Bureau of the Census, Census of Manufactures, Vol. I, Subject and Special
Statistics, at SR2-33 (1976).
189 In 1974 and 1975, the Justice Department decided not to challenge two huge mergers,
after making determinations that there was an insufficient basis on which to proceed in each
case.
One merger-believed to be the largest combination, in terms of assets paid, in American
corporate history-involved the acquisition by General Electric Company of Utah Interna-
tional, Inc. GE had sales in 1974 of over $13.4 billion, and assets of $9.4 billion. Utah
International had gross revenues in 1974 of over $500 million and assets of over $900 million.
The transaction, which was a stock-for-stock transfer, involved an exchange of $1.92 billion in
GE stock.See 744 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA), at A-4 (Dec. 23, 1975); Wall St. J,, Oct.
4, 1976, at 14, col. 4; General Electric Co. Annual Report (1974); Utah Int'l, Inc. Annual
Report (1974).
The other merger involved the acquisition by Mobil Oil Corp., at that time the third largest
American oil company with 1974 sales of $20.3 billion and assets of $14 billion, of Marcor, the
parent of Montgomery Ward, the nation's fourth largest nonfood retailer, with 1974 sales of
$4.6 billion and assets of $3.1 billion. This acquisition was a cash-for-assets transaction, in
which Mobil paid over $800 million for the controlling Marcor shares. 676 Antitrust & Trade
Reg. Rep. (BNA), at A-20 (Aug. 13, 1974); Wall St. J., Aug. 20, 1976, at 26, col. 2; Mobil
Annual Report (1974); Marcor Fiscal Report (Jan. 31, 1975); Forbes, May 15, 1975, at 129.
The late Senator Philip Hart, chairman of the Senate Antitrust Subcommittee in 1975,
wrote to the then head of the Antitrust Division, Thomas Kauper, that, if the Justice Depart-
ment felt that it was unable to challenge the Mobil-Marcor transaction, the Subcommittee
might want to renew its interest in new legislation to deal with such large acquisitions. 711
Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA), at A-13 (Apr. 29, 1975).
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In 1968, when the Neal Report was issued, its proposed merger act
would have defined as "large firms" only 265 companies in Fortune's listing
of the 500 largest industrial corporations; 190 the same threshold levels
today would include approximately 480 companies. 191 To the extent that
this expansion is due to inflationary factors, doubling the thresholds of
the Neal Report would be roughly compensatory: 192 the, resulting stan-
dard would impose serious limitations upon the ability of almost 300 of
the Fortune 500 companies to expand by major firm acquisition; 1 93 these
companies would be limited to de novo or toehold acquisitions in almost
every concentrated industry. Obviously, however, the number of com-
panies subject to these limitations would continue to increase with infla-
tion. Thus, a more appropriate solution would be an expanding threshold
level tied to a measurable constant such as the wholesale finished goods
index or the consumer price index.
The negative economic or social implications that may accompany some
large-firm conglomerate mergers do not necessitate, as suggested by the
Neal Report's draft act, proscription of all such mergers. That approach
was Draconian, absolutely foreclosing any analysis of the overall impact of
these transactions. Instead, the current judicial presumption in favor of
permitting mergers should be reversed; the burden of persuasion should
be placed from the start upon the parties to the transaction to justify
affirmatively any large-firm conglomerate merger that exceeds statutory
size and market share thresholds.' 94 The burden imposed would be
satisfied in one of two ways: the parties would be required to prove either
that the merger under scrutiny does not in fact have a negative impact on
competition, or that the merger, if it would have been considered to have
such a negative impact under currently applied judicial standards, is
otherwise justified by considerations of public interest; 195 examples would
"S0 See Fortune, June 15, 1968, at 186-204.
191 A total of 473 American industrial corporations have assets in excess of $250 million. An
additional eleven companies not meeting the asset threshold nonetheless have sales in excess
of $500 million. Fortune, May 1977, at 364-89; id. June 1977, at 204-30.
There are dozens of retailing, service, or public utility companies fitting these threshold
sizes not included in this Fortune magazine listing. For example, every one of the fifty largest
American retailing companies had sales in excess of $500 million, and every one of the fifty
largest utility companies had assets of over $1 billion. 1976 Fortune Directory 64-68.
1912 The wholesale finished goods index rose from 100 in 1967 to 193.0 in May 1978. The
consumer price index rose from 104.2 in 1968 to 191.3 in April 1978. (Base Year = 1967 =
100.) Statistical Abstract of the U.S., tables 705, 708 (1976); Wall St. J., June 5, 1978, at 3,
col. 1; id., June 1, 1978, at 3, col. 1.
193 The 1977 listing contains 285 companies with assets in excess of $500 million, plus
eleven other companies with fewer assets, but with sales in excess of $1 billion. Fortune, May
1977, at 364-89. Once again, there are dozens of sales and service companies not included in
this Fortune listing.
"' See Brodley, supra note 168, at 63-88 (structural-presumptive approach).
195 A presumption based upon proof of countervailing public interest would be comparable
to the provision of the Bank Merger Act of 1966, adopted by Congress in response to the
Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963).
The act provides that
[tlhe responsible agency shall not approve . . . any other proposed merger transaction
whose effect in any section of the country may be substantially to lessen competition, or
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be real efficiencies in manufacturing, marketing, or allocation of capital.
At a minimum, increased size and market share suggest a greater
probability of adverse effects upon competition.' 9 6 To this extent the
proposed statute is consistent with conventional antitrust theory. More-
over, traditional economic considerations would continue to apply exclu-
sively in merger cases not involving presumption-triggering levels and
would remain relevant to mergers exceeding those levels. 197 However, it
should be recognized that, under the proposed statute, concerns not
merely about the supposed economic effects of corporate concentration,
but also political and social concerns about that concentration, would
ultimately provide the justification for imposition of a higher standard of
judicial scrutiny upon large-firm mergers.'
This presumption-triggering threshold approach could easily be
coupled with existing statutory provisions that require firms to give notice
of proposed transactions to the antitrust agencies and to observe a waiting
period after such notice before consummation of a merger. 99 Should the
parties decide to proceed with the merger after the expiration of this
period, however, the presumption in the courts under the amended
statute would be against approval of the merger, with a burden upon the
defendants to persuade the courts otherwise. The existence of such a
to tend to create a monopoly, or which in any other manner would be in restraint of
trade, unless it finds that the anticompetitive effects of the proposed transaction ...
[are] meeting the convenience and needs of the community to be served.
12 U.S.C. § 1828(c)(5)(B) (1970).See United States v. Marine Bancorporation, Inc., 418 U.S. at
618 n.15 (lower court determination of convenience and needs discussed and approved).
Presumably, there will be some situations in which the challenged merger has positive
competitive benefits and minimal potential for adverse social and political impact. Assume, for
example, a four-firm oligopoly characterized by three firms with 30% market shares and one
firm with a 10% share. Although acquisition of the smaller firm by a large firm from outside
the market would be presumptively unlawful under the proposed standards, that presump-
tion could conceivably be overcome and the merger permitted upon a showing of the
acquisition's procompetitive impact. The entry of the large firm could stimulate more
vigorous competition among existing competitors and might permit introduction of econo-
mies or marketing and manufacturing innovations unavailable to the smaller firm prior to
merger.
"' See, e.g., Preston, A Probabilistic Approach to Conglomerate Mergers, 44 St. John's L.
Rev. 341 (spec. ed. 1970).
197 The presumption, in requiring affirmative proof that a merger meeting the proposed
act's size and market share levels does not lessen competition, would place companies meeting
these levels in a position similar to that facing companies under present section 7 after the
government makes its prima facie case of market concentration. See note 60 supra.
198 Obviously, the proposed statute would apply to all large-firm mergers-horizontal and
vertical as well as conglomerate.
199 Title II of the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvement Act of 1976, Pub. L. No.
94-435, § 201, 90 Stat. 1383 (amending 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1970)), added a premerger notification
provision to the Clayton Act. Section 7A now requires that large firms-those with total assets
or annual net sales in excess of $100 million-notify the Federal Trade Commission and the
Antitrust Division of the Department ofJustice of certain planned acquisitions of the securities
or assets of firms having annual sales or assets in excess of $10 million. The statute also
imposes a waiting period of 30 days before the merger may be consummated; this time may be
extended upon application to the courts by the antitrust agencies. The waiting period is
designed to allow the agencies to get more information for deciding whether to challenge the
proposed acquisition and is not intended as a substitute for a preliminary injunction.
CHALLENGING CONGLOMERATE MERGERS
presumption would necessarily require courts to grant a preliminary in-
junction pending disposition of any merger challenge upon proof by the
government that statutory thresholds had been met. 20 0 In order to reduce
possible concerns about political bias in enforcement of these stricter
antimerger provisions and to ensure adequate public notice of enforce-
ment standards, the amended statute should also require the agencies to
supply "no action" letters in those merger cases in which they decide not
to attempt a challenge after statutory notice. These statements, which
would set forth an evaluation of the probable impact of the merger and
the reasons for nonaction, could parallel existing settlement statement
provisions under the Clayton Act.2"'
An additional advantage to these changes would be the creation of a
more realistic deterrent to questionable acquisitions.2 0 2 Both the complex-
ity of existing enforcement mechanisms and the uncertainty that accom-
panies their application have significantly reduced the threat of antitrust
action as a concern of corporate officers in merger planning. In many
situations, the government does not even attempt to enjoin or to set aside
a merger under the existing statutory framework precisely because this
framework is heavily weighted toward success by a defendant on the
merits. Even if a merger should be successfully challenged and ultimately
set aside, the defendant still reaps the temporary and frequently consid-
erable benefits of access to the assets and profits of the acquired firm, and,
in all likelihood, the defendant will be neither fined nor subjected to
treble damage liability.20 3 In effect, virtually no disincentives exist to
attempted acquisitions under existing antitrust laws. A modified per se
approach, founded upon a rebuttable presumption of illegality against
200 Section 4 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 4 (1970), gives government attorneys the
authority to institute proceedings to enjoin violations of the antitrust laws. This provision has
been construed to include obtaining preliminary injunctions against proposed acquisitions.
See, e.g., United States v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 320 F.2d 509 (3d Cir. 1963). The Justice
Department must show a reasonable probability of eventual success on the merits to be
entitled to injunctive relief. United States v. Wilson Sporting Goods Co., 288 F. Supp. 543,
545, 567-70 (N.D. Il1. 1968).
The Trans-Alaskan Pipeline Authorization Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-153, 87 Stat. 592,
amended section 13 of the FTC Act, 15 U.S.C. § 53 (Supp. V 1975), to give the Commission
authority to obtain a temporary restraining order against violations of the laws administered
by the Commission, including Clayton Act § 7, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1970), as amended, Act of Sept.
30, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-435, § 201, 90 Stat. 1383. It is to be granted by a court only after
"weighing the equities and considering the Commission's likelihood of ultimate success." See
generally FTC v. Food Town Stores, Inc., 539 F.2d 1339 (4th Cir. 1976); FTC v. Lancaster
Colony Corp., [1977-2] Trade Cas. 61,562 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
20 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 16(b)-(g) (Supp. V 1975) (requirement that Antitrust Division prepare
competitive impact statement when submitting proposed consentjudgment to a court); cf. id. §
45(m)(1)(C)(3) (similar requirement under section 5 of the FTC Act).
202 See Blake, supra note 148, at 558.
203 Although private treble damage actions can be brought under section 7 of the Clayton
Act, see, e.g., Carlson Cos., Inc. v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 507 F.2d 959 (8th Cir. 1974), the
Supreme Court has recently imposed requirements that the plaintiff in such an action show
both that the injury was causally linked to the company's presence in a market in violation of
section 7 and that the injury reflected the anticompetitive effect of either the violation itself or
acts made possible by it. See Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477 (1977).
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large-firm mergers, could remedy this situation by serving as a realistic
deterrent while supplying businessmen with fair warning of the bounds of
permissible behavior.
The reforms proposed in this article would go far toward remedying
the defects in existing conglomerate merger enforcement mechanisms.
The resulting changes, however, would place even greater burdens on the
judicial system than those imposed by current antitrust litigation and
would thus add renewed vigor to demands for a separate system of
antitrust courts. As part of one of the major elements of his Industrial
Reorganization Act, the late Senator Philip Hart proposed, throughout
the early 1970s, creation of an Industrial Reorganization Court to adjudi-
cate the legality of monopolies in certain concentrated industries.20 4 This
proposal should be revived and a special court created with exclusive
jurisdiction over claims under the Sherman, Clayton and Federal Trade
Commission Acts. 20 5 Although such a court could be staffed by presently
sitting federal judges assigned on a rotating basis, permanent assignments
would assure continuity within the court and would allow the judges to
develop greater experience and expertise in dealing with the special
problems of antitrust litigation. One alternative would be to have this
court designated as a special "circuit court," taking appeals from all
antitrust cases decided in the federal district courts. A preferable measure
would involve making the special antitrust court a trial level court with
limited appeal to the courts of appeals and to the Supreme Court. Such a
measure would eliminate the delay inherent in having cases first decided
by a trial judge with relatively limited experience in antitrust matters, then
reviewed by the experienced antitrust court and, ultimately, by the Su-
preme Court.
20 6
204 Under the proposal, the Industrial Reorganization Court would have been staffed by 15
judges, with direct appeal only to the Supreme Court. The Industrial Reorganization Act
would also have created a new commission with responsibility for studying certain concen-
trated industries and for developing reorganization plans for those industries characterized by
monopoly or oligopoly. See S.1959, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975); S. 1167, 93d Cong., 2d Sess.
(1974); S.3822, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972).
Former FTC Commissioner Philip Elman proposed creation of a special Trade Court with
jurisdiction over both agency complaints and private actions brought by injured competitors
and consumers. See Elman, The Regulatory Process: A Personal View, 39 ABA Antitrust L.J.
901, 909 (1970).
205 The advantages of such a special court with special judges for dealing with a complex
statute is already recognized in the existence of the federal tax court. The jurisdiction of the
tax court, however, is not exclusive with respect to all types of tax claims.
206 The Expediting Act, ch. 544, § 2, 32 Stat. 823 (1903) (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 29
(Supp. V 1975)), authorized direct appeals by the government from district courts to the
Supreme Court in certain antitrust cases. The Court complained, in several opinions, that this
process deprived it of the benefit of preliminary review by an intermediate court, which might
indeed have avoided any need for Supreme Court review. Tidewater Oil Co. v. United States,
409 U.S. 151, 169 (1972); Ford Motor Co. v. United States, 405 U.S. 562, 595 n.5 (1972)
(Burger, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); United States v. Borden Co., 370
U.S. 460, 477 n.[*I (1962) (Harlan,J., dissenting). As a result, Congress virtually repealed the
Expediting Act in 1974, limiting direct appeals to situations in which the district court judge
certifies the need for immediate Supreme Court consideration. Antitrust Procedures and
Penalties Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-528, § 5, 88 Stat. 1709 (amending 15 U.S.C. § 29 (1970)).
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V. CONCLUSION
Conglomerate mergers are of considerable and increasing significance
to antitrust enforcement as well as to the American economy. Corporate
planners are opting for conglomerate acquisitions over horizontal or ver-
tical merger alternatives with greater frequency, and the absolute size of
the resulting combinations is rising. Section 7 of the Clayton Act, couched
as it is in economic terms, is not sufficient to the task of controlling this
major trend. Potential competition doctrine, which offers a means for
adapting section 7 to the specific problems of conglomeration, has re-
ceived an increasingly hostile reception in the courts. Because the alterna-
tive weapons of entrenchment and reciprocity carry their own theoretical
defects, they too have met with disfavor from both the courts and en-
forcement agencies. All attempts at merger challenge under section 7
have been hampered by that statute's requirement of proof of competitive
injury and by the unwillingness of the Supreme Court to sustain chal-
lenges in the absence of direct and immediate proof of that injury.
There is a clear need for legislative reform of section 7, both to remedy
the specific problems of conglomeration and to confront directly the social
and political implications of increasing corporate concentration. Any pro-
posal for legislative change, however, must end with a sober acknowledg-
ment that the prospects for reform in the immediate future are poor. In
the nine years since publication of the report of the President's Task Force
on Antitrust Policy, no legislation similar to its draft merger act has even
reached the floor of either house of Congress. Although Senator Hart's
Industrial Reorganization Act was the subject of Senate hearings, it ulti-
mately suffered a similar fate, despite repeated attempts to move it out of
committee. Given this political reality, the enforcement agencies must focus
their resources upon an extended program of vigorous challenges to con-
glomerate mergers, even if there is serious doubt as to the eventual success
of these prosecutions. Such action will serve as a source of continuing
pressure on the courts and as a reminder to Congress of the need for
legislative change. Even "unwinnable" cases, if brought against corporate
giants, will raise public and congressional awareness regarding both the
progress of corporate concentration and the present impotence of section
7 in dealing with conglomerate mergers.
The changes proposed in the text would meet the Supreme Court's expressed concerns
while adding an experienced and specialized trial court to aid in coping with the complexities
of antitrust litigation. The success of these proposals would ultimately depend, however, upon
the imposition of severe restrictions upon appeal from decisions of the antitrust trial court.
Delay is a constant element of antitrust litigation, and every level of appeal under the current
system adds at least a year to the time required for ultimate disposition of a case. In the
present IBM monopolization litigation, for example, the government launched its precom-
plaint investigation in 1966, filed a complaint in 1969 and went to trial in 1975. It is estimated
that the trial may take six years and the process of appeal and formulation of any ultimate
order as much as five more years. See 786 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA), at AA-10 (Oct.
26, 1976). The government's suit against Alcoa's aluminum monopoly during the late 1930s
and early 1940s took eight years from commencement of suit to final appeal. See United States
v. Aluminum Co., 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
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